


A thesis submitted to the University of Poona for the  
Ph. D. Degree in History.



By

Vidya Karve

Supervisor

Dr. K. N. Chitnis,  
M.A., Ph.D.,  
Dept. of History, Poona-7  
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## P R E F A C E

At the present moment the whole of the Indian Sub-Continent is entering upon a new phase of political life and bold schemes of social and political reconstruction are being daily pressed for acceptance. At such a moment, no apology would seem to be necessary for the writing of a new monograph which humbly attempts at unifying the whole of the Maratha nation which is now being studied by scholars as a history of Southern Maharashtra and Northern Maharashtra.

This work embodies the result of the investigations carried on by me as a research student in history during the years 1976-1979. The Reader of History who kindly undertook to direct me Dr. K. N. Chitnis, M.A., Ph.D., Reader in History at the University of Poona suggested that I should take up this subject, as he was of the opinion that the rule of the Marathas in South India A.D. 1600 to A.D. 1707 has so far not received the much needed corrective as the history of the Marathas in Northern India and there have so far been few attempts at presenting a corrected history, of the Marathas in South India during this period. Till recently, the History of the Marathas has been presented by such veteran writers like <sup>K.N.</sup> Rajwade, Sir J. N. Sarkar and Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai who have dealt with the achievements of the Maratha rule in

Northern India elaborately but have only succeeded in compiling sporadic papers relating to their activities in Southern India. Their attempts also give only one side of the picture. They have based their conclusions only on a study of the Marathi records and have failed to take cognizance of the numerous other sources that exist in other languages like English, Kanarese, Persian, Tamil and Dutch languages.

When I first began my researches on the subject, I was not aware of the stupendity that beset my task. Some of the materials were in languages, with which I had no acquaintance, in such cases I have consulted their English translations, sifting the information contained in them and utilising them in my thesis. Besides, I had no hunt for old Marathi records which had gone out of print. I had been assigned a very intricate period, which had been a little known chapter in the general history of India, and I accepted to work on it with a sense of trepidation, as it had been a little known chapter in the general history of India. Veteran Maratha historians like Sir J. N. Sarkar and Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai have failed to take cognizance of the Maratha activities in South India between A.D. 1600 and A.D. 1707 in a consistent manner.

They have made sporadic references here and there in their eminent works like the "House of Shivaji and the 'Marathi Riyasat' and later on 'the New History of the Marathas' or compiled stray papers in periodicals from time to time.

Here an humble attempt has been made by me to put forward a connected history of the Maratha activities in this region during the latter half of the 17th Century.

South India had been an integrated unit until the battle of Talicota in 1565 and the conquest of the offshoots of the Bahmani Kingdom by the Mughal Emperor Aurangazeb.

The fissiporous units of the Vijayanagar empire and the Bahmani empire offered a good arena for the display of the Maratha talents. This region was full of disorder and anarchy. It was the task of a new power like the Marathas to extirpate the elements of disorder and misrule and establish their authority on a sound basis. When the Marathas came on the scene, misrule and anarchy melted away in a short time.

The Marathas on their arrival on this scene of misrule and confusion, firstly introduced a new revenue system which resulted in the happiness and prosperity of the people and

this brought about a considerable addition to the royal treasury. That is revenue offices like Kulkarnis, Deshpandes and Deshmukhs who existed under the old regime of Bijapur and Golconda were retained by the Marathas also.

The Marathas when they came over to South India from their homeland of Maharashtra brought over a large number of Brahman finance clerks and Karkuns, the descendants of these men are still found in this region, bearing the various offices under the names of Deshmukhs, Deshpandes, Kulkarnis and Shirestedars, etc.

The sources for all the chapters in this thesis have been broadly divided into primary and secondary ones. They have all been detailed in the section on bibliography. The authors of these books wherever possible to obtain and the dates of their publication wherever available have also been detailed in that section.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I was a research student at the Poona University during the years 1976-1979, Dr. Chitnis, the Reader in History at Poona University who kindly undertook to direct me, suggested that I should take up the subject "Marathas in South India A. D. 1600 - A. D. 1707, as this topic had not so far received the much needed corrective. When I did undertake to study this subject, I did so with a sense of trepidation, as I was aware of the enormity of the subject, but my fear was soon dispelled, as many scholars helped me in the best tradition of Indian Scholarship. I shall, therefore, be failing in my task, if I do not put here on record my deep sense of gratitude towards them. When I am writing this present thesis for the Ph. D. Degree of the Poona University, I am deeply obliged to Dr. A. R. Kulkarni, Professor of History at the Poona University for the keen interest evinced in my work. I am deeply obliged to Dr. K. N. Chitnis, Reader of History, University of Poona, for offering me his valuable guidance in completing this work.

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
was kind enough to read through my manuscript and give me his criticisms and suggestions. I shall be failing in my duty if I do not acknowledge my gratitude to my husband Brigadier Y. R. Karve, who helped me in several ways in my crippled state of health in getting me books from the Bharat Itihas Sanshodaka Mandal Library and reading through the draft thesis and making corrections wherever necessary. I also take this opportunity to thank Mr. Pethe, the Librarian of the Jayakar Library and his staff for assisting me in the selection of books from the above Library.

I also wish to record my thanks and gratitude to my dear mother and my numerous brothers and sisters and son Lt Col Srikant Karve, for assisting me with my numerous demands for the necessary finances ungrudgingly, whenever I demanded from them and to my aunt Dr. Mrs. Krishnabai Nimbkar, whose keen moral support in my moments of despair, without all of which it would not have been possible for me to finish this work.

Vidya Karve

ABBREVIATIONS

1. S.B.M.H. Source Book of Maratha History by Patwardhan and Rawlinson.
2. E.F.I. English Factories in India by William Foster.
3. M.N.S.N. Muhammad Nama in Shivaji Nilhadavali.
4. S.B.M.N. Shiva Bharat and Muhamad Nama by Elliot and Dawson. *Abols, Foster*
5. Hist. History of India as told by her own historians. *Abols, Foster*
6. E.C. Epigraphia Carnatica.
7. P.S.S. Patra Sara Sangraha edited by G. H. Khare.
8. N.M. Nayaks of Madura.
9. A.V.C. Apratima Vira Charitam.
10. A.M.R.F. Annals of the Mysore Royal Family.
11. C.B. Chikkadeva Raja Binnapan.
12. K.N.V. Kantirava Narasa Raja Vijayan.
13. M.D.P.V. Mysore Dhoregala Purvabhudaya Vivara.



## KARNATAKA

## CHAPTER I

### WAYS AND MEANS OF MARATHA EXPANSION

The Maratha empire was the last of the indigenous empires in India. During the early decades of the 17th century the Marathas were a race little known to the world outside, but in the 18th century their power had increased considerably in India. During the age of the Peshwas they not only became the virtual arbiters of the fate of the Mughal empire and their power had increased to such limits that they carried their banner to the banks of the Indus, while they rushed furiously across the length and breadth of peninsular India.

When a major power entertains imperialistic desires one of the prime requisites is a sound system of finance. The formation of an empire involves the forcible subjections of weaker powers. Therefore conquest invariably leads to war and war requires funds for its execution. Hence the Marathas had devised a steady means by which they would be assured of a steady source of income.

The best method of ensuring a steady income was to develop the natural resources of one's own territory. But the Marathas lived in a region that was sterile and nature

did not endow a return that was commensurate with the <sup>not</sup> ~~joys~~ of the Maratha peasant. They therefore adopted the device of collecting tribute from their neighbours.

At this time the Mughal empire was in a state of disintegration. The whole of south India was covered by a number of independent states. No doubt the Nizam acted as the Emperors' deputy in the Deccan, but his hold over these country was rather loose. Hence when all the small states acknowledged the supremacy of the Nizam they did so only outwardly. In practice, however, all of them acted as sovereign powers.

During the campaigns the Marathas claimed to tax the people in some thing or other. To uphold their sovereign rights many of the states in South India frequently tried to evade these payments to the Marathas. Hence, to maintain their rights and to secure their due-amounts from unwilling neighbours, the Marathas had to lead frequent expeditions into south India.

This is the reason why we find wave after wave of the Maratha expeditions pouring into the rich plains of South India almost annually during this period. Whenever they resorted to forcible methods of collection it often resulted

in a war in which the Maratha were often victorious, success in a war lend them to dictate terms to the enemy, and frequently the territory that belonged to the foe passed into their hands. Thus the collection of 'chauth' and 'sardeshmukhi' insidiously enabled the Marathas to expand their sphere of influence and ultimately led to the expansion of their empire as well.

The term 'Chauth'<sup>1</sup> has long been associated with the Marathas as an expansion of their ingenuity. The Marathas demanded 25 % of the revenues of a territory as a result of this claim. Nevertheless they were not the originators of the ingenious method of raising revenue. Long before the coming of the Marathas into prominence, a petty chief like the Raja of Ramanagar is said to have taken chauth from the Portuguese subjects at Daman<sup>2</sup>, on a quid pro quo basis—that is the chauth was a sort of remuneration for the performance of certain police duties, in return to which the Raja and his subjects were to avoid inflicting any injury over the chauth paying districts. If any of the Rajah's subjects<sup>3</sup> committed theft or robbery the Rajah was obliged to pay compensation for the losses inflicted by his subjects<sup>4</sup>. Further the Rajah with his army was also expected to serve the Governor and Captains of the fortress of Daman<sup>5</sup>.

Thus it is quite obvious that when Portuguese conceded this impost to the Rajah of Ramanagar, they in no way acknowledged the Rajas' sovereignty<sup>6</sup>. On the other hand we are told the Raja occupied the position of a vassal under the Portuguese.

The system of demanding Chauth readily suggested itself to the resourceful mind of Shivaji. Besides striving as he was to achieve his two fold aims of fighting for his people and religion and also subdue the disruptive forms of feudalism. Shivaji was in need of a strong army the efficient maintenance of which required a long purse. Observing that a pretty chief like the Raja of Ramanagar had ensured himself of a steady and permanent source of income, Shivaji also determined to try an expedient on similar lines. Shivaji's frequent visits to Surat, then the richest emporium of trade in the east, made him pass through the principalities of Jawhar and Ramanagar. But he realised that he would not claim the Chauth unless and until he annexed Ramanagar to his kingdom.

It was with this intention, therefore, that he conquered the territory of the Raja of Ramanagar and when he did so all the rights and privileges of the conquered power automatically passed into his hands, and Shivaji demanded from the Portuguese

as a matter of course. Shivaji did not confine himself to the Portuguese alone his levying this impost. On the contrary he collected it from all the powers with whom he came into contact<sup>7</sup>.

Shivaji when he came to collect Chauth from his opponents undertook to render them no service whatsoever. The Chauth in Shivaji's time was purely a contribution paid by defenceless subjects of every territories for the security of their lives and property from the invading army of the Marathas. Neither did Shivaji claim it as a hereditary pension entitled to him on any imperial farman. His claim to Chauth rested purely on a basis of might.

It must be said to the credit of Shivaji, however, that no molestation was ~~every~~ done by his men to the towns and villages which paid Chauth to him. Further when Shivaji annexed a town or district he took all possible care to protect the population from the military excesses of his solders.

The successor of Shivaji Sambhaji and Rajaram also followed in the footsteps of their ancestor. *I have* from the time of Shivaji Chauth and Sardeshmukhi were levies like the Danageld in Europe, a sort of purchase price for peace.

In the reign of King Shahu and in the period of the Peshwas this device of collecting Chauth from the various rulers came in quite handy to the Marathas to establish their supremacy in India. At the conclusion of the war with Auranzib the Maratha army had swollen into enormous proportions and a number of war lords with great experience prestige and power had arisen desring the fierce contest which lasted about 25 years.

Footnotes on Chapter I

- 1 CHAUTH literally means a quarter.
- 2 Sen, Military Systems of the Marathas,
- 3 Ibid p. 20.
- 4 Ibid p. 36.
- 5 Ibid
- 6 Ibid p. 50.
- 7 Ibid
- 8 Ibid p. 40.

# Map to Illustrate The Spread of the Maratha Power

**SOUTH INDIA**



## CHAPTER II

### SHIVAJI THE PIONEER AND HIS ROLE IN SOUTH INDIA

A.D.1600 - A.D.1664

The term 'South India' is capable of several interpretations in the general history of India. Some historians consider South India to mean all the region in peninsular India south of the Vindhya mountains whilst to some of them South India is that part of the country which lies below the Godavari river. Hence in this work the designation South India is applied to the country below the Krishna River and comprised within the latitudes of  $16.5^{\circ}$  north and Cape Comorin in the South and  $74.5^{\circ}$  and  $80.5^{\circ}$  east longitude not including South Kanara, Coorg, Malabar, Cochin and Travancore. This region can again be divided into Payanghet or the low lands and Balaghat or the hilly country which lies on the borders of the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea respectively.

This area is very rich in its history and an humble attempt is made here to study the history of the Marathas in these regions during the period A.D. 1600 to A.D. 1707.

During the 17th Century when the Mughal empire was in the plentitude of its power south India was in a crumbling condition. Already a century had elapsed since the dissolution of the

Bahamini Kingdom and the Vijayanagar empire was more a memory than a political entity to reckon with. The offshoots of the Bahamani Kingdom like the Nizam Shahi State was tottering to its fall while Golconda and Bijapur were emitting a last and fitful glow before their extinction. Hence South India offered a tempting field to adventurous spirits whether they were of local or foreign origin. Our concern in this chapter is to trace the doings of some of these adventurers who ultimately proved themselves to be the creators of a new order.

At the outset it is necessary to bear in mind that the 17th century opened with the death of Akbar (1605) and closed with the death of Aurangzeb (1707) in India. These two titans each ruled for over half a century enclosed between their reigns an epoch of grandeur and power such as had ever been witnessed in India since the days of the imperial Guptas. The last period of Muslim rule in South India was certainly over and the vanishing shadow of Vijayanagar brooded over a number of warring chieftains rather than states who had been its subordinates and feudatories. Bijapur and Golconda were like two alligators trying to swallow these political ephemera while the imperial cat in the form of the Mogals was already at their back about to swallow them.

The Marathas stepped in at this juncture and all anarchy and misrule melted away before them. A new revenue arrangement was introduced by the Marathas which resulted in the happiness and prosperity of the people. New revenue officers like Kulkarnis, Deshmukhs and Deshpandes were introduced by the Marathas in the new financial system that was established by them in South India. The descendants of these men brought into South India are still to be found there bearing the various names of Deshmukhs, Deshpandes, Kulkarnis and Shirestedars and others.

Personality has ever played a paramount part in politics and though our aim here is historical than biographical, we have necessarily to note a few landmarks in the career of the early makers of Maratha history in which Shahaji Bhonsale plays the chief part.

Shahaji was the son of Maloji Bhonsale a mansabdar of 5000 horses<sup>1</sup> in the services of the Nizam-Shahi dynasty of Ahmednagar. He was born on 15th March 1594, and succeeded to his father's mansab in 1619. He was married to Jijabai, daughter of Lukhoji Jadhav Rao in 1605. His second marriage took place in 1625 to Tukabai Mohite at Bijapur. These details are of importance on account of their political consequences.

Shivaji was born of his former wife Jijabai and Vyankoji of the latter. Both became founders of states and took active part in the politics of South India whose history we are to trace later. Besides these two marriages, led to family feuds which were not without significance in shaping important events. One of the immediate results of the dispute which arose was that Lukhoji Jadhav Rao went over to the Mughal camp while Shahaji remained one of its last defenders. It is not to be supposed that Shahaji's services were disinterested for he was also a fortune hunter and changed sides as exigencies dictated.

When Shahaji succeeded to the mansab of his father Maloji Bhonsale in 1619 A.D. Malik Anber was the chief minister of the Nizam Shahi State. As he was a soldier of fortune he was now changing sides now going to the Mughals now joining the Bijapurians for the circumstances were such that no absolute consistency could be expected from anybody but contriving always to secure recognition as the holder of his ancestral jaghirs.

It was during this period that in between 1619 to 1636 that he tried to build up his dominions in the Ahmednagar kingdom, partly as a king-maker and later on in a more direct capacity, and could only achieve his aim partly because of the

persistances with which the Muglas and Bijapurians combined to thwart his attempts. It was due to the indomitable endeavours of Shahaji that Ahmednagar was to recover from its disasters and rise again with a fresh vitality. His greater skill and talents as a commander that secured for him the victory in whatever struggles he was engaged in and he extended the territorial limits of the Ahmednagar kingdom by sundry annexations besides the recovery of the ~~town of~~ <sup>town of</sup> Ahmednagar. He also improved the administration the administrative machinery and rehabilitated its finances.

The never-ending internicine quarrels of the Mughal army and the great help which his Maratha troops rendered him and helped him defeat twice the imperial armies sent against him in 1612 A.D. But in 1615 A.D. he was severely defeated and the victorious Bhatwadi troops in commemoration of their triumph marched to Daulatabad and razed its buildings to the ground. Prince Khurram brought the war to an end in 1617 A.D. when Shahaji was compelled to surrender Ahmednagar and other forts.

But by 1620 A.D. Shahaji having recovered lost ground once more opposed the imperialists relentlessly, devastating the Mughal and Adil Shahi territories. He even went to the

extent of besieging the Mughals in their long established strong-holds in Khandesh, namely Balapur and Burhanpur. But the advance of the Mughal troops under prince Khurram compelled the Deccanis to raise the seige of Burhanpur and the wrath of the prince was mollified by the destruction of Daulatabad, the capital of the Nizam Shahi state for a second time<sup>3</sup>. In this struggle Jadhava Rao Shahaji and Nimbalkar of Phaltan fought on the side of Malik Amber and they exhibited great valour and courage<sup>4</sup>. For the first time the clever generalship of Shahaji made raid after raid on the Mughal Camp. By such deeds he won the admiration of not only of Amber but also of his master the Nizam Shah.

The recall of prince Khurram from the Deccan by order of Emperor Jehangir gave a breathing time for Amber and Shahaji to carry on their constructive work, but the desertion of Jadhav Rao to the enemies side, and his alliance with the imperialists, as a result of the quarrel with his son-in-law Shahaji, and his cousin, was the most unfortunate episode in the epoch of Ahmednagar history<sup>5</sup>. Jadhav Rao was made the mansabdar of 2400 horses<sup>6</sup> and emperor Jehangir conferred on him a farman for this rank upon him<sup>7</sup>. Malik Amber did not mind this for Shahaji proved to be a greater asset than Jadhav Rao ever did. In the following year Shahaji proved his worth by capturing Poona.

The Bijapur Sultan and the Mughal government now entered into an alliance with Golconda and inflicted a defeat on Bijapur<sup>8</sup>. He also besieged the city of Bijapur and could not have abandoned his operations had it not been for the timely arrival of the imperial forces for its relief. Desirous of avenging their humiliations the Bijapur soldiers, strengthened by the imperial troops, marched on into the Nizam Shahi dominions and satiated their wrath in blood and battle. The battle between the armies of Ahmednagar and Bijapur is given in detail in Shiva-Bharat, and an account of the prominent leaders who fought on either side. The Ahmednagar army was conspicuous for its valour and daring in the fight. It was commanded by Malik Amber and strengthened by leading Maratha nobles among whom Shahaji was one. This victory over the combined forces of the Mughals and Bijapur not only displayed the strength of Malik Amber but also proved beyond doubt the valour and eye for strategy which Shahaji exhibited. The complete discomfiture of the imperial army and the disaster which had befallen Bijapur both at Burhanpur and Sholapur were not at all due to the octogenarian Malik Amber but were largely attributed to the valour and tactics of Shahaji and other Bhonsale commanders<sup>9</sup>. The opportune revolt of Shah-Jehan that occurred at this juncture and his subsequent alliance with Malik Amber gave the Malik, further hope to deal advantageously

with the imperial troops. Shah-Jehan who was assisted with some troops of Malik Amber laid siege to Burhanpur itself but abandoned it on the arrival of reinforcements from Delhi under Prince Parvez and Mahabat Khan<sup>10</sup>.

Dr. Balkrishna thinks that Shahaji left Ahmednagar service at this juncture because Amber showed his favours and rewards to Shahaji's cousins to spite Shahaji and did not show preference to Shahaji himself though he was the person that got for Malik Amber victory in all the struggles with his enemies<sup>11</sup>. The shrewd Shahaji perceiving all this left the service of the Nizam-Shah and retired to his own jagir. But he was very soon invited to enter the service of the Adil-Shah who wanted to wreak vengeance on the Nizam Shah for his defeat at Bhatwadi. Shahaji was offered the post of Sir-Lashkar of the Bijapur army and Adil-Shah was very highly pleased with his conquest. The powerful lord of Phaltan Mudhoji Nimbalkar who was a truculent feudatory of Bijapur, was completely humiliated and brought to submission while Shahaji's victories over the chiefs of Kerala and Karnatak filled the coffers of the Adil Shah<sup>12</sup> and spread Shahaji's reknown throughout the land.

Important changes took place in the Deccan politics at this time. Khan Jehan Lodi was appointed Mughal viceroy of the Deccan while Mahahat Khan, the experienced general was recalled to

court<sup>13</sup>. Malik Amber died in 1626 A.D. and was since succeeded by his son Fateh Khan to the Nizam Shahi wazirship<sup>14</sup>. The Bijapur sultan Ibrahim Adilshah II breathed his last in September 1627<sup>15</sup> and his minor son ascended the throne with the help of Khawas Khan and the leader of the Abysimian faction Mirza Muhammad Amin. The youthful<sup>16</sup> Sultan began to ill-treat his Hindu subjects in the region and this exasperated Shahaji who left Bijapur in disgust and rejoined the service of Ahmednagar which was threatened by Jadhav Rao and the Mughal attacks<sup>17</sup>. Jadhav Rao also had left Mughal service in 1627 A.D. to serve the cause of his old master Nizam Shah. By this time Ahmednagar was able to regain all the territories which it had lost during the reign of Akbar due to the treachary of Khan Jehan Lodi, the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan for three lakhs of rons. Khan Jehan Lodi had bartered way his loyalty to his imperial master and agreed to restore "all the country of Balaghat as far as the fortress of Ahmednagar" to the Nizam Shah. Fateh Khan the new wazir sent Shahaji to east Khandesh against the imperial general Darya Khan Rohela but the Maratha leader had to suffer a defeat.

Hamid Khan had replaced the incapable Fateh Khan. Nizam Shah who was weakened by a number of palace intrigues by evil councillors, who had lost his sense of justice and acting on

the advice of Hanid Khan imprisoned Fateh Khan and contrived the murder of Jadhav Rao. This last act of his, alienated from him, the sympathies of Shahaji as well as several Muslim and Maratha commanders and they left his service.

Determined to take revenge on the nizam Shahi state for their murder of his father-in-law, Shahaji plundered territories of Ahmednagar as mercilessly as he did in Bijapur and took possession of a few districts. To punish the rebellious conduct of Shahaji, Morar Pandit a Maratha Brahmin in the Bijapur services was sent by Adil-Shah to capture Poona, territories of Junnar, Sangamner, Bijapur and Bhugole, which he had previously conferred on Shahaji. On account of this Shahaji left the nizam service. The emperor, then forced a larger territory which included Nasik, Trimbak and good portion of the Nizam Shahi dominions on Shahaji.

Shahaji now placed a rival puppet on the throne of Ahmednagar and openly opposed Fateh Khan. Shah-Jehan's desire to conquer permanently the Deccan Sultanates led him to a violation of the treaty which he had concluded with Bijapur in 1631<sup>18</sup>. The consequence was, the formation of an united front consisting of Quth-Shah, Adilshah and Nizam Shah, to oppose Mughal aggression. Even the Portuguese at Goa are said

to have supplied Bijapur with arms and ammunition and other weapons<sup>19</sup>. The emperor commissioned his father-in-law Asaf Khan to punish the recalcitrant triumvirate, but his attempted siege of Bijapur resulted in a severe failure, and in partial destruction of the Mughal army in 1619.

During these four years (1632 - 1636 A.D.) Shahaji was virtually independent of both<sup>20</sup> Bijapur and Ahmednagar and his grand objective was to save the Ahmednagar kingdom from the clutches of the Mughals. The able and energetic Mahabat Khan was appointed the viceroy of the Deccan and the humiliated general Asaf Khan was recalled to the court where he was disgraced. The incapable Fateh Khan had neither the provisions nor the men to defend the Nizam-Shahi capital and knowing this Shahaji now entered into an alliance with the Bijapur Sultan. The sultan sent a large body of troops to assist Shahaji at Daulatabad. A Mughal army commanded by Mahalat Khan arrived in the region with a view to securing Daulatabad. Coming to know of this, Shahaji in his turn to assist Fateh Khan, earnestly appealed to him not to surrender the famous fort to the Mughals and the Deccan Army. After sustaining a siege of four months the fortress of Daulatabad surrendered to Mahabat Khan. The Jadhé chronology gives dates of 7th June 1632 in the capture of Dowlatabad<sup>21</sup>.

Shahaji was not content to see Daulatabad pass into Mughal hands. As a counter-measure of defiance to them he crowned at Pemgiri in August 1632, an obscure member of the Nizam-Shahi family with the title of Murtaza Nizam Shah<sup>22</sup> with the help of the Bijapur troops under Murari Pandit. Shahaji devastated the surrounding territory<sup>23</sup>. When Mahabat Khan and Dava-Shukoh heard about this, he proceeded along and enriched the fort of Parenda. The Bijapur troops defended the city heroically and the Mughal army was forced to raise the siege.

Rustum-i-Zaman one of the Bijapuri generals pursued the Mughals right to Burhanpur and killed many of the soldiers<sup>24</sup>. Terms given in Shiv-Bharat differ slightly from the account given by Abub Hamid Lahori in his Badshah Nama<sup>25</sup>. By these methods Shahaji gathered the bones of the Nizam-Shahi and infused life into them. His loyalty to the state which had marked his early age would not tolerate its absorption into the imperial Mughal dominions. The alarming aspirations in the Deccan and the successful operations of Shahaji which had been the main contributory causes led emperor Shah Jehan to proceed to the Deccan with an army of 50,000 to mend matters. After subjecting the surrounding territories of Bijapur to remorseless destruction, the emperor came to an agreement which was the corner stone of the Mughal conquest in the

final stage. The Ahmednagar kingdom was callously divided between the Adil-Shah and the Mughals, and it was agreed between them that Shahaji should not be entertained in Bijapur service unless he surrendered certain forts like Junnar and Trimbak still in his hands to Shah Jehan. If he declined, he was not to be harboured in Bijapur territory or even allowed to enter it<sup>26</sup>.

The Bijapuri forces now began to press Shahaji hard and he was driven from place to place, being compelled to evacuate one post after another and in order to escape the wrath of Bijapuri soldiers finally took shelter at Mahuli (March 1636) where he was besieged by Khan-Zaman and Ranadulla Khan<sup>27</sup>. He realized that any assertion of his independence would be foolish at this crisis, when he was hemmed in, from all sides by his enemies and therefore surrendered Mahuli fortress into the hands of the besiegers and once again entered into Bijapuri service and greatly benefitted that state on two occasions, once in A.D. 1646 even when he had been arrested for alleged disobedient conduct but was liberated mainly on account of the reputation and influence which his achievements had earned for him under the Bijapuri banner, and when he carried the arms of the Adil Shah far into the South and became in reality almost the independent Governor of the new conquests for which he was mainly responsible.

The conclusions of the treaty with Golconda Bijapur, with the Mughal emperor in 1636, gave enough relief from the anxiety for the security of the northern frontier and enabled them to extend their armies into the disturbed country south of the Tungbhadra.

The treaty which followed between the Mughal emperor and the Deccani sultans afforded the latter a respite on their northern frontiers which they fully utilized for extending their dominions southwards. Golconda and Bijapur were like the new extinguished Nizam Shahi inheritors of the Bahamani traditions. The renewal of the war with what remained of the once glorious Vijayanagar empire was therefore quite traditional for them. Besides there were alluring prospects in the south from whose territories and treasures the sultans could compensate themselves for losses sustained by them at the hands of the Mughals. To these temptations were the inviting of the scions and vasals of Vijayanagar, namely, the Nayaks of Ikkeri, Mysore, Jinji, Tanjore, Madura and others who by their suicidal antagonisms undid all the good work of the great rulers of Vijayanagar. The "Muhammad Nama" (Official chronicle of the king's of Bijapur) plainly declares, "As the Karnatak and Malnad had not been conquered before by any Muslim king of the

Deccan, Muhammad Adil Shah thought of bringing them under his sway in order to strengthen and glorify the Islamic religion in the dominions of the Hindus<sup>28</sup> and to win for himself the titles of Mujahid and Gahyi" adds the 'Basatin-u-s' Salatin.

The objectives being thus settled, geography and their relative strength and status determined, the respective shares in the spoils of victory between Bijapur and Golconda, agreed upon, it was agreed upon that Golconda was to extend along the east coast below the Krishna delta, Bijapur to conquer the Western Karnatak, Malnad and the Mysore plateau. The forces of the two inevitably met in the Eastern Karnatak near Jinji and thereafter the division depended on the principle of might is right. The fate of small and big principalities depended on the Machiavellan guide lines of grab as grab can, and neither border nor breed was respected.

The century which followed the debacle of Tallichota was one of disintegration for the Vijayanagar dominions. Venkatapati II and Sriranga III were two rulers of the Aravidu, who struggled heroically to preserve their great inheritance. But the Nayaks and polygars, their nominal vassals saw to it that they did not succeed. The petty chiefs of Ikkarni, Mysore, Jinji, Madura and Tanjore who were originally officers of Vijayanagar had gradually

become its feudatories and independent rulers. Now they acted as enemies, rebels and traitors. Though ultimately all of them went the way of traitors for the time being these short sighted and selfish rebels played havoc with the remnants of the Vijayanagar empire.

Here the interest lies chiefly in the work of Shahaji and the Marathas who came into this disturbed atmosphere as agents and auxiliaries of the Bijapur King, but remained in the south to found a dominion of their own.

Shahaji served under Muhammad Adil-Shah (1636-56) and Ali-Adil Shah (1656-64). The Bijapur Kingdom survived him only twenty-two years, for it was absorbed in the Mughal empire in 1686. The principal generals who led the southern campaigns were Randwees Khan (636-43) Mustafa Khan (1643-46) and Khan Muhammad (1648-57). Shahaji was associated with all of them practically throughout and rose latterly to be one of the most important Bijapur generals. He was appointed Governor at Bangalore and entrusted with the work of consolidation and extension of the Adil Shahi authority. He was misunderstood or misrepresented by his Muslim colleagues more than once. But every time he vindicated himself successfully and died in harness as a loyal servant of the Adil-Shah in 1674. His

southern activities certainly proved more fruitful in Maratha history than his earlier adventures in the Nizam Shahi.

Shahaji's antecedents at the commencement of his enforced Adil-Shahi service must be borne in mind in order to be able to assess his position correctly. Though defeated in war it is not to be forgotten that he had been lately an ally of his late master the Nizam-Shah.

Between 1637 and 1640, three expeditions were sent into the Malnad area of Mysore. They were led by Raudalla Khan and Shahaji who were old friends. The first was against Ikkeri and Basavapatna, which were ruled respectively by Virabhadra and Kerge Hanuma. The Muhammad Nama relates Kenge Nayak the Raja of Basavapatna who had an ill will against Virabhadra through the deplorable tendency of taking revenge, informed Rustun-i-Zaman (Randula Khan) the path by which he could conquer the whole country and reach Ikkeri quickly if he gave him a lakh of hons as his reward and recommended him to his king, Rustan-i-Zaman agreed to this<sup>29</sup>. The result of this treachery was that Ikkeri was conquered and Virabhadra was compelled to shift his capital to Bidnur<sup>30</sup>. Two years later a punitive expedition was led against him for not having paid the stipulated tribute. Dr. S. K. Iyengar says that 'Ikkeri might

have been annexed, but was saved by the intervention of Shahaji and agreed to be vasal kingdom under Bijapur<sup>31</sup>. An inscription of 1641 speaks of Virbhadra as having given protection to the Southern kings, who were alarmed by the great army of the Patushah<sup>32</sup>.

The next expedition was against Kasturi Ranga of Sira and Kempe Gauda of Bangalore in 1683. The former division was led by Afzalkhan and the latter by Randulla Khan and Shahaji. In this expedition, Afzal Khan murdered the chief of Sira during a feigned interview and captured his stronghold<sup>33</sup>. The chief of Tadpatri saved himself by cleverly diverting the Muslim army to Bangalore. The latter place was conquered by Randulla and Shahaji and Srirangapatna was next attacked (1639), but according to the Kannada work Kantirva Narsaraj Vijaya composed in 1648, the Muslim were defeated and driven out<sup>34</sup>. The Muhammad Nama, however, claims that the Raja after a month's resistance saved his kingdom by paying attribute of five lakhs of hons<sup>35</sup>. The Siva-Bharat also claims that the Raja after month's resistance saved his kingdom by paying a tribute of five lakhs of hons<sup>36</sup>, which it says, was applauded by Rustami-Zanah (Randulla Khan). It also adds that the Nayaks of Kaveripattna and Madura also submitted during this campaign<sup>37</sup>.

The third expedition was provoked by the revolt of King Hannuma who appears to have engineered a general rising of the Hindu rajas in 1639. He had gathered together an army of 70,000 men to defend his capital city of Basavapattna. But his bitter enemy Virabhadra of Bednur saw in this an opportunity for revenge and joined the Bijapur forces. The defenders made heroic resistance but Basavapattna was conquered. Kenge Nayak was obliged to pay 40 lakhs of hons. Shahaji from all accounts is said to have played a prominent part in Tumkur and Chikkanaya in Kauhalli, the last of which was alone yielded 20,000 hons another 20,000 hons were got from Belapur another 80,000 were got from Ballapur. An abortive understanding with Shri-Ranga Rayal was attempted but it proved of little consequence. Rustaur-i-Zaman carried away all the moveable treasures from Kolihal (Kunihal, 40 miles west of Bangalore) and left the empty fortress to Sri-Ranga as agreed to before.

On going down to the Karnatic, at first Shahaji resided at Bangalore. When tranquility was restored to the country he made Balapur his Headquarters. At that time powerful prince named Vijay Reghav reigned at Tanjore. He was at enmity with the Raja of Trichinopoly. The latter made an alliance with Shahaji against Tanjore, offering to make a united war against

Tanjore and conquer its territory and promising to contribute five lakhs of rupees to Shahaji in his war expenses and all the booty. Shahaji invaded the principality of Vijaya Raghav. The prince was defeated and fell on the field of battle. Tanjore fell into the hands of Shahaji, who found an immense treasure there. Shahaji saw that Tanjore was indeed a fertile and wealthy country and determined to retain possession of it. He gave the Raja of Trichinopoly to understand that he meant to keep Tanjore and that he need not make any payment for the expenses of the war. The raja was irritated by this reply and declared war. He was defeated and his principality too fell into Shahaji's hands. The Bijapur Government confirmed him in possession of these new territories.

Shahaji did not live long after his return from Tanjore and the Karnatak. His resumption in the Adilshahi service culminated in his accidental death on the 23rd January 1664, due to a fall from his horse at Hodigere on the bank of the Tungabhadra, when he was sent by the ruler of Bijapur to subdue Bhadrappa Naik and Shivappa Naik two recalcitrant chiefs. Two polygars of Bednore who were harassing Bijapur. When these two polygars were subdued after surrendering some territory to the Bijapur Sultan the Adil-Shah was pleased with this last service of Shahaji and thus came into royal

favour again. While celebrating his victory, Shahaji went out on an hunting expedition in pursuit of a hare to a village named Hodigere, where his horse's hoof was caught in a fishure (hole) while riding his horse impetuously after the game. Shahaji was kicked by his horse and both the animal and the rider were immediately killed.

Thus ended the glorious life of one of the great men of the 17th century. A loyal servant and an able administrator Shahaji was great in many respects. He was mainly responsible for the penetration of Bijapur in the South, which set at naught the endeavour of Sriranga III at imperial unification. He consolidated under his sway the Bijapur Karnatak and bequeathed it as his heritage to his son Vyankoji. More than this, he had shown by his example a path of effecting Hindu consolidation, when Shahaji succeeded to his father's, Maloji Bhonsale's, mansab in A.D. 1619. Malik Amber was the Chief Minister of the Nizam Shahi State. Shahaji was a soldier of fortune changing sides as exigencies dictated, that is, now going to the Mughals, now joining the Bijapurans, as the circumstances were such that - no absolute consistency could be expected from anybody. But he always contrived to secure recognition of his ancestral jahgir.

It was during this period 1636-1639 that he tried to build his dominions in the Ahmednagar Kingdom by sundry annexations besides the recovery of the town of Ahmednagar, while his father-in-law went away in a huff and pique, Shahaji proved a more loyal supporter of the kingdom though not of every prince that sat on the Nizam Shahi throne. So we should judge Shahaji's actions in terms of the situations as they arose than praise or condemn. He could rise above his contemporaries but not above his age.

Shahaji's role was not that of conscious builder but he did serve in carrying forward the cause of his illustrious son Shivaji. Shahaji did not have Shivaji's sense of mission, his was an humbler role but the most necessary task of preparing the ground not by precept but by example by daring and doing. In this sense he was the most successful among the pioneers of Maratha freedom and prestige and not being free himself he made possible the freedom of his people who were fashioned into a nation by the genius of his son Shivaji. Innumerable Maratha families who sought service under the Bahamni sultan through their very servitude, were gathering experience in arms and administration. These people were then to consolidate the richest assets of later generations. It was left to Shahaji Bhonsale of all the men of his race and generation to play the

more ambitious part of a king maker and fight for the defence of the Mughals. If he failed he failed honourably and if he was consequently obliged to accept service under the enemy with a sense of realism courage and dignity and self-respect it was his practical wisdom.

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His resumption of service in the Adil-Shahi state about 1663 culminated in his accidental death at Hodigere in Basavapatna taluka on the bank of the Tungabhadra on 23rd January 1664, while on a campaign to subdue the recalcitrant chieftains affords us no clue to the inner workings of his mind. He died where he had first begun earlier expeditions under Randulla Khan in the Shimoga district of Mysore.

Shahaji with all his limitations served in his own way the cause of the Maratha domination in South India. At the time of his death his conquests included Anegundi Basavapatna Kanakgiri, Tegnapattan Porto Novo, besides his personal estates scattered in the Deccan and Karnatak. They constituted the scaffolding on which his two sons Shivaji in the Deccan and Vyankoji in the South were to erect their kingdom for the greater glory of the Maratha people.

In 6411

Foot Notes on Chapter II

- 1 Grant Duff, History of Marathas, Vol. 1, p. 91.
- 2 Lewis Rice, Mysore Gazetteer, Vol. II, p. 434.
- 3 R. S. Iyer, Nayaks of Madura, p. 240.
- 4 Grant Duff, History of Marathas, Vol. 1, p. 138.  
G. S. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. 1, p. 138.
- 5 Marks Wilks, History of Mysore, Vol. 1, p. 138.
- 6 R. N. Saltore, Journal of Oriental Research, (Madras, 1939), Vol. 13, pp. 62-63.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Annals of Mysore Royal Family, p. 105.
- 9 R. S. Iyer, Nayaks of Madura, part III, p. 249.
- 10 Mysore Rajargala Vamsavali, given in Rajawali Kathe pp. 440 to 448 and p. 28.
- 11 Elliot and Dowson, H.I.H., Vol. VI, Part I, p. 95.
- 12 Balkrishna, Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, Part I, p. 65.
- 13 Patwardhan and Rawlinson, Source Book of Maratha History, p. 8.
- 14 Elliot and Dawson, H.I.H., Vol. VI, p. 95.
- 15 Patwardhan and Rawlinson, SBMH, p. 13.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Ibid. pp. 6 and 9.
- 18 Ibid. pp. 6 and 9.

- 19 Shivaji Nibhandawali, Part I, p. 90.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Balkrishna, Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, p. 39.
- 22 G. H. Khare, Patrasar Sangrah, Nos. 26, 29, 36 and 92.
- 23 Epigraphica Carnatica, Vol. VII, Sh. 2.
- 24 Shiva Bharat
- 25 Balkrishna, Shivaji the Great, Vol. I, p.111.
- 26 B. S. Saltore, Sardesai Commemoration Vol. X (1938).
- 27 Verma, MN, pp. 27, 28.
- 28 S. K. Iyangar, Baroda Lectures.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Rogers and Berridge, Memoirs of Emperor Jangir, 2 Vols.
- 32 F. R. Heras, Aravidw Dynasty.
- 33 Beni Prasad, History of Reign of Jangir.
- 34 Jedhe Chronology, Proceedings of the forth Annal Conference of the Bharat Itihas Sanshodhak Mandal, ( Poona ), 1917.
- 35 Basatin - U. S. Salatin, Littograph, Hyderabad.
- 36 Beni Prasad, History of the reign of Jahgir.
- 37 Basatin - US-Salatin, Littograph, Hyderabad.

### CHAPTER III

#### PATRIMONY

Shahaji had made himself indispensable to the Adilshahi and he was the prop of the Karnatak dominion. To secure his patrimony in the Karnatak, it was as necessary for Shivaji as his independence in the homelands. Hence Shivaji exerted himself to the utmost to release his patrimony from the harassing domination of the Muslims.

After his grand coronation in June 1674, Shivaji had firmly established himself as sovereign over Maharashtra, he turned his attention to the Karnatak which was not merely a piece of territory but a heritage. Shahaji when he died had left behind a large number of scattered jaghirs and estates of which Bangalore was initially the most important part of Shahaji's headquarters.

According to Grant Duff and Sir J. N. Sarkar Shivaji is said to have launched two Karnatak expeditions, one in 1664 and the other in 1665 and that he went against the Bednur Kingdoms and that these expeditions bought him the expected treasures<sup>1</sup>. These expeditions are not mentioned in the Kannada sources. Mysore was not disturbed by any of these expeditions and nothing particular seems to have happened in his relations with Mysore till 1677. Therefore, the only

expedition we have to take cognizance of was that of 1677, which had a direct bearing on Shivaji's relations with Mysore. Kannada sources also throw a flood of light on Shivaji's expedition of 1677<sup>2</sup>.

The causes of Shivaji's Karnataka expeditions are, very controversial. Several causes are said to have brought about the expedition, chief among them was the political confusion which reigned supreme in South India. Having made his position secure at Tanjore, Ekoji turned his attention to conquer Trichinopoly, where the voice of Madura was predominant. Chokkanatha opposed the Maratha expansion. Akoji's change of capital from Bangalore to Tanjore was not very much appreciated by Shivaji as it gave Mysore a free hand to interfere in Maratha affairs in South India. The war like activities of the Nayaks of Madura and Trichinopoly threatened the Mysore possessions in the region of Madura. Andhra-Treire writes "Mysore which cannot see without uneasiness a bold set of people establishing themselves on her own northern frontiers, fortifying the citadels taken from the northern provinces of Madura, gather fresh troops and make grand preparations for war, on the pretext of strengthening herself against the Muhammadans, she may have in view an attack of Madura when the Nayak will be involved in his war with Tanjore"<sup>3</sup>.

Moreover with death of Sriranga Raya, the Vijayanagar empire had gone into the background and this was an occasion for the South Indian chieftains to seize what little territory that empire had under its control. In Ikkeri, Channamaji succeeded Ramashekara Nayak, but her succession was opposed by a party headed by Thimanna<sup>4</sup>.

Bijapur was hard pressed by a civil war between the Afgan party and the Dekkani party. As a result of this its control over South Indian territories declined. Thus there was a political vacuum in South India.

Secondly Ekoji now followed an unwise policy of shifting his capital from Bangalore to Tanjore in 1675<sup>5</sup>. The formulation of the Maratha power in the south was certainly the contribution of Ekoji but his going to the extent of changing the capital at a time, when Chickadevaraja of Mysore was an aggressor, was not a wise step. He could have easily followed the policy of his father by appointing Maratha generals to distant provinces and holding his permanent court at Bangalore. In fact Shahaji had controlled three principalities from Bangalore. Ekoji could also have done that easily. But he did not choose to follow that wise policy as a result of which there was an obstacle to the Mysore expansion in the north. Shivaji's conquest of his

father's territories around Bangalore indicates his desire to secure them from falling into the hands of Chickadevaraja. Thus Ekoji's policy of transferring his capital was one of the factors that induced Shivaji to undertake the expedition in 1677.

Thirdly the death of Shahaji in 1664 and the departure of Ekoji from Bangalore, the Maratha possessions in Mysore relinquished their allegiance to Ekoji and asserted their independence. Kolar, Dodballapur declared their independence in 1670 respectively<sup>5</sup>. During the time of Shahaji, these two places had been the principal centres of Maratha activities and these two places were now lost to Ekoji. And lastly Chikkadva Raja ascended the throne of Mysore in May 1673, and during his thirtyone years rule (1673-1704) the chief point of his policy was the Mysore expansion<sup>6</sup>. It was an important period because he was playing a game of higher stakes, that is of making himself politically as well as militarily strong in South India. The transference of the Maratha capital from Bangalore to Tanjore by Ekoji provided an opportunity for Chikkadwaraja to project a scheme of conquest in the region of Karnataka and Bijapuri Balaghat. But before Chickadevaraja could act and go on his expedition the Bijapur Sultan had appointed Jehagir Khan and Hussain Khan to look after the

Karnatak possession<sup>7</sup>. Chikkadevaraja's progress, however, was not deterred by the sultan's appointment of these two officers. In the south Ekoji and Chokkanatha Nayak were fired by the ambition of acquiring territories of Madura, which were under Mysore control. In the north the main obstacle in the way of Mysore expansion was Jehangir Khan and Hussain Khan. Chikkadevaraja reinforced the forts in the northern region and kept fresh troops to counteract the movements of the Nayak of Madura and Ekoji<sup>8</sup>. Chikkadevaraj then launched his expedition and succeeded in conquering Ketasumdra, Kandikere, Handalgere, Gudur, Tumkur, Jurevekare, all of which were in Tumkur district in 1653. Jehangir Khan was expected from Honavali in April 1676 and Hussain Khan from Bom-Samudra in January 1674<sup>9</sup>. Neither Ekoji nor the Bijapur sultan were able to take any effective steps against the Mysore aggression as they were preoccupied with the war against Chakka-Natha Nayak of Madura over the question of Trichinopoly<sup>10</sup>. The Bijapur sultan could not interfere owing to a civil war between the Afgan and Deccani party for power<sup>11</sup>. The task of Chikkadevaraja, of plundering and occupying the Maratha territories in Tumkur district was easy owing to the lack of any opposition. When it was known that Shivaji intended to take Bednur and Karnatak in conquests, he could not have remained ignorant of Chikkadevaraja's aggression in South India.

It is now necessary to notice the objectives with which Shivaji undertook the Karnatak expedition in 1677. There are conflicting reasons given in different sources, Scholars have advanced various conflicting reasons namely :

1. 'The partition issue',
2. 'Plunder',
3. 'A second line of defence' and
4. 'The revival of the Vijayanagar empire'.

These views have been advanced to explain the ultimate objectives in undertaking the Karnatak expedition. None of these explanations fully clarify the causes of this invasion.

Maratha chronicals like the Chitnis Bakhar says that Shivaji demanded half the share of his father's jaghir in South India which Ekoji was enjoying undisputedly for thirteen years after the death of Shahaji. Raghunathpant placed him at the head of the government and had completely handed over all the belongings of the late Maharaja. They were all Shivaji's patrimony as well; Ekoji had enjoyed all the share of them till this time and Shivaji had not demanded as he was far away. Shivaji had waited for all these twelve or thirteen years but Ekoji would not relinquish them voluntarily<sup>12</sup>. Ekoji, however, argued that during the life time of their father Shivaji had

rebelled against the Badshah and had forcibly taken possession of the imperial territories. Shahaji had suffered on that account in various ways. Ekoji had remained with his father and behaved obediently and hence the Badshah had preserved their property. This property was held on service tenure and as Ekoji called himself a Badshahi officer, what claim had Shivaji to this property?<sup>13</sup>. It was a fact that Ekoji lived with his father and assisted him in his administrative work till the death of Shahaji. He became the Bijapur governor for the Karnatak possessions. The point of subordination is clear as not only Ekoji but other Maratha generals like Vedoji-Pant, Antoiji Raghava Pandit and others were working under the sultan of Bijapur<sup>14</sup>.

However, the partition issue was not the factor which induced Shivaji to undertake the Karnatak expedition and claim a share in the father's jahgir. This becomes quite obvious when we argue that if Shivaji could claim in his father's southern Jaghir, Ekoji could also claim a moiety of his father's Poona Jaghir and also a share in the conquest of Shivaji. In fact 'Sabhasad' does not favour the idea of partition, but says that Shivaji claimed his father's twelve badges of honour which were in the hands of Ekoji<sup>15</sup>.

Sir J. N. Sarkar has put forward the view that Shivaji's objective in undertaking the Karnatak expedition was with a view to acquire wealth. Sen observes that there would have been no difficulty in maintaining an empire from the capital, provided the communications were safe and good. Further the various conquests that Shivaji made in eastern and central Mysore and in the territories of Bijapur in the course of his return journey were a complete testimony to the fact that he was aware of the necessity of maintaining active communications between Maharashtra and South India. However, Sarkar is silent on this point and yet he says in his 5th edition, that "gold and not the land was his chief object"<sup>16</sup>. It is difficult to agree with Sir J. N. Sarkar that gold alone prompted Shivaji to undertake the expedition. Land was also there in his view, though some of the territories he conquered were not new, and had been in Maratha occupation. What Shivaji desired was to take all these territories under his own direct control. The letter of Andra Freire and Sabhasad clearly explain that the territory that was occupied by Shivaji was in the Tanjore region as well as in the Bangalore principality. Thus from the study of what Shivaji did in South India it is possible to conclude that both gold and land were his chief objectives.

Ranade has raised the argument that Shivaji's conquest of South India was as a second line of defence. Ranade says that he had a premonition of coming events and by his conquest and alliance formed a new line of defence in Southern India in the Kaveri valley to which he could retire in case of necessity<sup>17</sup>. Sen is also half inclined to agree with this view of Ranade. He wisely annexed this far off colony as he had probably foreseen that it might one day serve as a place of refuge for his successors. A shrewd and wise statesman like Shivaji would not otherwise run the risk involved in the invasion of South India, while a strong Mughal army was posted in the Deccan<sup>18</sup>. Ofcourse, Gingee gave shelter to the Marathas under Rajaram for a few years but the Marathas ultimately returned to Maharashtra. Because Shivaji was at the height of his power, we cannot infer that he was thinking of withdrawing from the South in case of emergency and hence we cannot accept completely the view that he wanted to retain his conquests in South India and Mysore solely for defence purposes. Moreover he handed over the conquests in Bangalore principality to Dipabai wife of Ekoji a few months later. According to Chikkadevaraj Binappan Shivaji was then at the height of his power. He devastated the region which he entered by means of gureilla warfare, defeated the ruler of Bijapur and took his

lands and cities and humbled the ruler of Golconda and with that pride he entered South India.

Shivaji's idea of revival of Vijayanagar is yet another view advanced to explain the objectives of Shivaji's South Indian expedition. He is credited with having born to revive Vijayanagar's imperial traditions in all its granduer. The two sources on which this view is based are, Shivaji's silver plate record to the widow and two sons of Srirangaraya III, donating hundred villages and issuing of a unique gold coin - hon in imitation of the Pagoda of Vijayanagara. But these epigraphical and numismatical evidence merely shows Shivaji's <sup>humility</sup> towards the family of the emperor who had come to grief.

But these epigraphical and numismatical evidences cannot be above suspicion. We cannot expect Shivaji to imitate the Mughal rupee in preference to the Vijayanagar pagoda, Satyanatha Iyer advanced the view that Shivaji cherished the "ambition to stand before Aurangajeb as the acknowledged successor of Emperor of Vijayanagar. His southern invasion had in it an idea of reviving the Hindu empire in the South"<sup>19</sup>. S. K. Iyengar held the view that the death of Sriranga III had something to do with the coronation of Shivaji<sup>20</sup>. Satyanath

Iyer changed his opinion in his subsequent work and says that all these speculations were caused mostly by the then uncertainty of the date of Sriranga's death, but we know definitely that he died in 1672. However, if Shivaji really wanted to step into the place of Shri-Rangaraya he would have postponed his coronation, which actually took place in 1674 and recrowned himself in 1678 after his coromandal expedition. He concludes by saying that there was politreal vacuum in the Eastern Karnatak which Shivaji abhored and that he wanted to carve out a principality out of the chatoie political units<sup>21</sup>. Besides Shivaji reduced vellore which belonged to the Vijayanagar emperor. This clearly indicates that Vijayanagar empire was not the chief motive<sup>22</sup>. The Mysore Rajas also assumed the role of the restorers of the empire and most of the inscriptions indicate their interests in such a revival. But the fact seems to be that neither the Maratha nor the Mysore Rajas were really interested in reviving the old empire. They were only using it to serve their own interests and to concit<sup>23</sup> their intentions of expansion in the South. By 1674, the suzereignty of Vijayanagar in South India had become rather an ideal than a reality after the short lived success of Kodanda Rama I, in November 1675, he was actually in position to claim to rule the kingdom of Mysore, from the throne of the Karnatak empire<sup>23</sup>.

According to Sardesai, Shivaji's main object was to prevent Ekoji of Tanjore from paying feudal obligations to Bijapur and to bring him under his control. Shivaji did not confine his vision of freedom only to Maharashtra (Pan Maharashtra) ideal of Hindupad Padashahi. Lastly Sardesai considers Shivaji's daring in the South Indian expedition as a link in the unifying claim of imperial aims. He gives nine arguments in support of his theory (1) Shivaji's coronation titles like Kahatriya Kulavatanisa, Sihasnadhisvara (Sri Shrivachanrapati and Go Brahaman Partipala-ka (the motto on his seal) containing expression like ever growing commanding obedience from the world and shining forth for the good of the world; his acceptance of Yuathi as the colour and language and his revival of an world institution like the council of Ashtapradhan, Sanskrititation of the designation of pradhanas, his position as a varna steamite etc. (2) his method of territorial expansion by Chauth and Sardeshmukhi, (3) his friendly attitude towards Jaswant Singh and Jai Singh and his letter to the latter expounding his pan-Hindu ideal coupled with the goodwill and religious tolerance, (4) his letter to Aurangzeb on his religious intolerance, (5) his letter to Maloji Ghorpade for united action, (6) his visit to Agra, (7) his Karnatak expedition, (8) his marriage with eight ladies,

(9) Ratnakar Bhats eulogy of Jaisingh in Sanskrit verse referring to his triumph over Shivaji and others who coveted the imperial throne of Delhi<sup>24</sup>.

To sum up therefore, the main objects of Shivaji's South Indian expedition was according to Mudachari, with which I am also inclined to agree, was the conquest and consolidation of the South Indian territories, with a view to strengthening his own political position. The weight of all the available evidence is in favour of the view that the conquest was the ultimate objective with which Shivaji undertook the Southern expedition in 1677.

Now the question arises as to who was the originator of the South Indian expedition of Shivaji? According to Marathi sources Raghunath Narayan Hanmante was the originator of the South Indian expedition. Owing to sharp differences of opinion between Ekoji and Raghunath Narayan on administrative policy, the latter resigned the service of Ekoji, contacted Madanna Pandit the Golconda minister, went to Poona, and induced Shivaji to undertake the South Indian expedition and claim half of the South Indian Jaghirs of his father<sup>25</sup>.

At the beginning of 1677, Shivaji started on his South Indian expedition. The army that followed Shivaji is estimated

differently by various sources. The Kannada source, Chikkadevaraja Binappan fixes it at 60,000 horses and a lakh of foot<sup>26</sup>, whereas Sabhasad limits it to 25,000 horsemen<sup>27</sup>. Gery estimates it as 40,000 foot and 20,000 horsemen<sup>28</sup> and the Madras Council further says that Shivaji continued recruiting soldiers to his army during the course of his march to South India. According to Wilks the army consisted of 40,000 horses, an equal number of foot, with a train of artillery<sup>29</sup>. Tirumalaya, the author of Chikkadevaraj - Binappan had estimated Shivaji's, as 60,000 horses and a lakh of foot when it actually arrived at Srirangapatna from Tanjore. The Madras council mentions that Shivaji raised and had been raising the army until he reached Tanjore. Therefore at the time of starting on the expedition Shivaji might have commanded as Wilks believed an army of 40,000 foot and an equal number of horses.

Shivaji reached Hyderabad in February 1677 and the Qutb Shah received him warmly and frequent meetings were held between the two. A month was spent in long discussions and conferences with the Sultan. The Sultan and his minister Madanna Pandit agreed to support Shivaji by paying a daily subsidy of 30,000 pagodas or 4½ lakhs of rupees a month and also by furnishing an army of 1,000 horses and 4,000 foot with a train of artillery on condition that half of the conquered territories in South

India will be handed over to Golconda in addition to half of the war spoils. They agreed to resist the Mughal aggression. The Sultan consented to keep a Maratha ambassador at his court. The Kannada source Chikkandavaraja Binnappan continues thus "Shivaji with the help of 60,000 horses and a lakh of foot had humbled the ruler of Golconda and received a tribute (subsidy) paid by him"<sup>30</sup>. A letter from Fort St. George dated 27th June 1677 says : "Mr. Child writes sevagee is in a castle of the king of Golconda where he intends to winter and after the rains its thought intends against the carnatic, several of the Deccan umhra are joined with him"<sup>31</sup>.

With a plentiful supply of cash and efficient pack of artillery, Shivaji descended into the South Indian countries<sup>32</sup>. In July 1677 he was in possession of Gingee. In the same month he marched to Tanjore and halted at Tiruvadi on the Coleroon to meet his brother Ekoji. In this interview which was the first and the last between the two brothers, and unable to meet the demands of his brother, Ekoji stealthily escaped leaving behind him the twelve badges of honour bequeathed by Shahaji<sup>33</sup>. Andre Freire, says that after surrendering the Kingdom of Gingee "Shivaji pretended to respect the provinces possessed by his brother and advanced as if to pay a friendly visit to him. Ekoji full of confidence and in high spirit came to meet

him and found him beyond the coleroon". But natural sentiments were suppressed by ambition and Shivaji put him in chains to extract from him all the treasures. Ekoji having managed to escape crossed the river and hid himself in the woods. Shivaji took possession of all the provinces north of the Coleroon<sup>34</sup>. Martin says, that, first conversation gave evidence of enmity and trendesiousness and then it came to negotiations, when Ekoji discovered that his brother would not let him go unless he had satisfied himself about his claims. He sought of some means of withdrawing himself from such a bad straights<sup>35</sup>. A letter of Fort St. George says that Shivaji "waxed very angry and had him begone" who presently went away. Yet another better says that "the Raja hath given order to take possession of all his brother's country"<sup>36</sup>. Taking possession of all 12 badges of his father and the territories of his brother Shivaji returned to Vellore in August 1677. From there Shivaji extended his incursion into Mysore.

The question now arises as to why Shivaji invaded Mysore. Several causes brought about Shivaji's invasion of Mysore. Chief among them were Shivaji's ambition for money, the fabulous wealth of Mysore, the role of the local chieftains, and Shivaji's idea of conquering Bednur and Kanra. After the conquest of Gingee, Shivaji was faced with serious financial

difficulties. The Sultan of Golconda stopped paying him money, because Shivaji did not keep his promise of sharing the spoils of the Karnatak wars with him<sup>37</sup>. Besides Shivaji spent large amounts of money and all the resources of his dominions over the fortifications of the principal towns which he had conquered in the South<sup>38</sup>. Naturally the less had to be compensated either by plunder or conquest of new territories. Secondly it was a wellknown fact that Mysore was rich in resources, a land of gold and hidden treasure. Under Chikkadevaraja the Mysore Kingdom had reached the peak of its glory and material prosperity. Chikkadevaraja is spoken of by his friend Tirumolraya as educated and trained in politicis, gymnastics and many other manly exercises. As crown prince he had exhibited a remarkable military skill on the occasion of the siege of Erode<sup>39</sup>. Under his rule Mysore was able politically and sound financially. Letters of 24th August 1677 and 31st October 1677 from Fort St. George explain "the great riches" of Mysore<sup>40</sup>. Thirdly the Chieftains of the South India, who had been reduced by Chikkadevaraja, invited Shivaji to Mysore in order to wreak vengeance upon the conqueror. The chieftains of Dhilgota, Malai, Muttanjathi, Perwathi, Salnur, Sadamangalam, Anantagiri, Aryalur, Foregum and Dharampuri met Shivaji unitedly and acquainted him with the internal situation of Mysore<sup>41</sup>.

This was but an invitation for Shivaji to march on Mysore. Finally, Shivaji had already planned the annexation of Bednur and incorporation of Kanara into the conquest of the South Indian territory. Thus the need for money, the fabulous wealth of Mysore, the appeal of the oppressed Karnatic chieftains and the decision to annex Bednur and join Kanara into his new conquests induced Shivaji to invade Mysore.

M. H. Krishna of Mysore doubts the presence of Shivaji in the Mysore campaign. But the fact that Shivaji passed through Srirangapatan and fought a pitched battle with the Mysore army could be proved. Edward Scott Waring writes "Shivajee seizing Gingee extended his incursion into Mysore" "Besides seven letters written from Bombay to Surat dated 27th June 1677 and the participation in the Mysore war well indicate this fact. Apart from these letters there are contemporary Kannada sources like 'Apratima Vira Charitam Chikkadevaraja Binnapam' and epigraffic records clearly mention the name of Shivaji in the fight that followed between the two armies of Mysore and Maharashtra.

About the middle of August 1677 Shivaji entered Srirangapatna. The letters of August 1677 speak of Shivaji's incursion into Mysore and the great riches that were carried

off by him from Srirangapatam<sup>42</sup>. No sooner had Shivaji entered Mysore he saw with much gratification those chieftains who had suffered heavily at the hands of Chikkadevaraja. They supported Shivaji in his adventure of robbing Srirangapatam, which was rendered easy by the alliance of these chieftains - Such of the rulers as had submitted to Chikkadevaraja by fear had come to an union immediately patching up their differences, visited Shivaji and disclosed to him all the secrecy of the kingdom thus profited by this he advanced at their head against Chikkadevaraja<sup>43</sup>. The same Kannadee source mentions in another place that Chikkadevaraja had to face the danger from "Turukas" (Muslims), the "Morasses" (Telgus - Tamil people), the "Kodagas" (people of Coorge), the "Aryas" (Marathas), the "Marevaer" (Hill tribes), and the Sultans of Bijapur and Golconda<sup>44</sup>. Shivaji entered Srirangapatam plundered the city, where he got innumerable riches<sup>45</sup>.

Chikkadevaraja had a strong nerve to face the enemy in the battle that ensued between the two armies and Chikkadevaraja Vodiar won a victory causing much havoc in the ranks of the enemies. Chikkadevaraja Binappan says that when Chikkadevaraja of great valour was devoting himself to the sacred duty of ruling his empire from Srirangapatam, Shivaji who had devastated by means of guirella warfare the entire domination of Delhi and

Bhaganagar was falling down before, him and presenting tribute. He thus acquired the title of 'Apratimavira' (imparalled hero) which is one of the distinctive epithets of the Mysore Rajas. These sources, namely literary and epigraphil and Fort St. George letter are emphatic in saying that Shivaji suffered utter disconfiture at the hands of Chikkadevaraja in his work. But Sardesai, who is an authority on Maratha history, makes no reference to the defeat of Shivaji by Chickadevaraja in his work 'New history of the Marathas'. This is because Mr. Sardesai has not consulted the contemporary Kannada sources. The success which Chickadevaraja achieved, had not only enhanced his reputation before the eyes on his contemporaries, but also decided his position as indisputed master of Mysore<sup>46</sup>.

Although Shivaji's invasion of Mysore is only passing episode in the General History of the Marathas, it is in fact an event of great significance, when viewed from the position, that Chikkadevaraja occupied. Having vanquished such a mighty invader Chikkadevaraja assumed the title of "Apratima Vira" (unparalleled hero). On the whole the consequences of Shivaji's incursion into Mysore, strained the relations of Maharashtra and that Chikkadevaraja stood as an opponent to Shivaji in Southern India<sup>47</sup>.

From Srirangapatam Shivaji extended arms to his ancestral possessions in Mysore namely Bangalore, Kolar, Hoskote, Sira and Chikkaballapur which were controlled by Ekoji from Tanjore. Shivaji started with two sardars Anand Rao and Manaji More, took the forts of Kolar and Balapur, built some new forts, destroyed the turbulent polygars and appointed 'Karkuns' and Rango Narayan as surbahdar and handed over the territory to the management of Raghunath Narayan and stationed Manji More with his army in the Kolar region and having taken Anand Rao with him, he proceeded to Koppal<sup>48</sup>.

J. N. Sarkar says that Shivaji acquired no man's land in this region. In the light of the above circumstances it is difficult to concur with this views of Sarkar. Shivaji had completely established his suzerainty over the Jaghirs of his father in Mysore, which can be proved by his grant of a village named Rama Sannudra in that region<sup>49</sup>.

The period 1672 to 1686 when the Bijapur Kingdoms were finally extinguished was a period of great chaos and confusion in the Bijapur Kingdom. There were four regents each trying to oust his predecessor, seizing the region for himself, struggling to safeguard the interests of his own factions at the cost of others. The provincial satraps were on the look out for an

opportunity to shake off their servitude to the Adilshah. The Mughals were also making constant but unsuccessful attempts to subdue the Bijapuris. Such a sorry state of affairs was a direct invitation to a ruler like Shivaji to intervene and further the cause of 'Hindavi Swaraj'.

Among the numerous petty chieftains who were the creation of Bijapur and who were now trying to throw off the yoke of Bijapur, the Desai's of Lakshmeshwar were one. The earliest Desais to come in contact with the Marathas were perhaps the Kanchangods III, the sixth member of the dynasty who ruled from 1649 to 1673. Taking advantage of the chaotic state of affairs prevailing in the Bijapur state, consequent on the death of Adil Shah II, Shivaji endeavoured to bring under his sway as many Bijapuri chieftains as possible. In 1673 he sent an army under Pratap Rao Gujar who invaded Bombay-Karnatak area looting Hubli and other places including Lakshmeshwar. But Bablol Khan checked the onward advance of the Maratha forces setting up a military outpost at Kolhapur, in June 1673.

Between January 1674 and July 1675, the Lakshmeshwar Desai's became the feudatory of Shivaji<sup>50</sup>. Shivaji confirmed the grant of the main village of Saunshi to Khangauda III which he had originally received from the Bijapur sultan. In 1675 Khangauda III

was in a position to prove his loyalty to Shivaji, for his administration perhaps was very good due to the keen rivalry between Khawaskhan and Bhalol Khan. Pleased with the Lakshmeshwar Desai, Shivaji rewarded him with a regrant of the main village of Saunshi where Govinda Raghavnath, Subedar was in charge of the Subah of Gadag, of which Lakshmeshwar Pargana formed a part<sup>51</sup>.

To sum up therefore, Shivaji was on his way back from South India by May 1677, for the English at Madras reported in May 1677, that Vyankoji had got back his territories by paying three lakhs of hons in cash to his brother Shivaji. Thus according to an English report dated 16th January 1678, "to strengthen his alle (ally) - Simas, to prosecute his father's victorious desigues, - the whole of South India was peeled to the houses by his system of plunder - was the assertion of the English factors".

Foot Notes for Chapter III

- 1 Grant Duff, History of Marathas, Vol. I, p. 7.
- 2 J. N. Sarkar, Shivaji and his Times, pp. 233 to 235.
- 3 Lewis Rice, Mysore Gazetteer, Vol. II, p. 434.
- 4 S. R. Iyer, "La Mission D<sup>e</sup> Modure" Nayak's of Madura, p. 240.
- 5 Grant Duff, History of Marathas, Vol. I, pp. 220-221.
- 6 Wilks, History of Mysore, Vol. I, p. 157.
- 7 Madras Oriental Manuscripts Library, Part II, p. 31.
- 8 Mysore Rajargala Vamsavali, p. 105.
- 9 S. R. Iyer, "La Mission D<sup>e</sup> Modure" Nayaks of Mysore, p. 249.
- 10 Mysore Rajavali Kathe, pp. 440-448.
- 11 Sen, Shivachatrapati, pp. 125, 126.
- 12 J. N. Sarkar, Shivaji and his Times, pp. 287-288.
- 13 Govinda Vaidya, Kantiraya Narasaraja Vijayam, Vol. 13, pp. 1-100.
- 14 Sen, Shivachatrapati, pp. 125-126.
- 15 J. N. Sarkar, Shivaji and his Times, p. 302.
- 16 Ranade, Rise of Maratha Power, p. 174.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 S. Sen, Studies in Indian History, p. 145.
- 19 S. R. Iyer, Nayak's of Madura, pp. 176, 177.
- 20 Ibid., p. 66.
- 21 Tamilians in 17th Century, pp. 100, 101.
- 22 Epigraphia Carnatica, Vol. XIV, Ch. 92.
- 23 Sen, Shivachatrapati, p. 119.

24 G. S. Sardesai, Main Currents of Maratha History, pp. 69, 75.

25 Chikkadevaraja Binnappan, pp. 4 to 16.  
(As quoted by Mudda Chari in his Mysore Maratha Relations).

26 English Records on Shivaji, Vol. II, p. 150.

27 Ibid.

28 Wilks, History of Mysore, Vol. I, p. 50.

29 Chikkadevaraja Binnappan, (as quoted by Muddachari in his Mysore Maratha Relations).

30 English Records on Shivaji, Vol. II, pp. 1127-1128.

31 Chikkadevaraja Binnappana, (as quoted by Muddachari in his Mysore Maratha Relations).

32 English Records on Shivaji, Vol. II, pp. 132, 135, 145.

33 R. S. Iyer, Nayaks of Mysore, p. 282.

34 Sen, Foreign Biographies of Shivaji, pp. 303-304.

35 English Factory Records on Shivaji, Vol. I, p. 132.

36 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission De Madura", Nayaks of Mysore,  
Vol. III, p. 272. <sup>Madura</sup>

37 Deshmukh, English Factory Records on Shivaji, Vol. II, p. 133.

38 Chikkadevaraja Binnappan Vanshavali, p. 172.  
(as quoted by Muddachari in his Mysore Maratha Relations).

39 English Records on Shivaji, Vol. II, pp. 135, 145.

40 Tirumalaraya, Apratima Vir Charitum, Vol. I, p. 130.

41 Ibid

42 Ibid.

43 Chikkadevaraja Binnappan, Vol. VII, p. 2.

(As quoted by Muddachari in his Mysore Maratha Relations)

44 English Records of Shivaji, p. 145.

45 English Diary and Consultation Books, 1678-79, p.153.

46 Wicks, History of Mysore, p. 109.

47 Sen, Shivechatrapati, pp. 127-128.


48 Ibid.

49 G. H. Khare, Shivacharitra Sahitya.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

TO ILLUSTRATE MARATHA RULE IN THE CARNATIC



MAP OF THE TANJORE AND NEIGHBOURING DISTRICTS

## CHAPTER IV

### MOVEMENTS OF THE MARATHAS IN SOUTH INDIA IN THE REIGN OF

#### SAMBHAJI

After his marvellous success in the invasion of South India about October 1677, Shivaji breathed his last in April 1680, less than three years after his annexation of Tanjore, and therefore he had little time to consolidate his gains in the South. Shivaji had invested large amounts of money in constructing new fortifications in the South and his strained relations with the Sultan of Golconda resulted in his refusal to sanction money on the ground that Shivaji had violated his agreement with him and with Golconda.

Besides, Shivaji was an ambitious Maratha. It was his ambition for money and his unsound financial position and the other two factors mentioned above, namely, that of building new fortifications in the South and the deterioration of his relations with the Sultan of Golconda, created constant financial difficulties, which Shivaji wanted to make good by plundering the rich provinces of the South, like Mysore and Tanjore.

Shivaji, before he left South India, acquired a large number of forts, which were garrisoned, and Subhedars and Havaldars were appointed for Porto Novo, Pondicherry,

Kunnimendu and Ginji districts. Raghunath Pant Hanmante was appointed by him to be in general management of South India. Harji Mahadik, son-in-law of Shivaji (husband of Ambika Rai the daughter of Shivaji), was appointed by him to regulate the affairs of the Karnatak.

Shivaji died in April 1680. No sooner did he breath his last than his two sons Sambhaji and Rajaram entered into bitter quarrels for the possession of the throne of Maharashtra.

The death of Shivaji was also an occasion for the Marathas of South India to assert their independence. Martin writes, "The news of Shivaji's death created a great confusion among the Chief Officers in these parts, (that is in the province of Ginji and the eastern Karnatak and some of them seemed to stay in their Government and rendered themselves independent"<sup>1</sup>. By the order of Sambhaji, Janardhan Pant and Raghunath Narayan, who had been left in charge of South India, were arrested and put into prison. Sambhaji sent his brother-in-law Harji Mahadik to take charge of the Ginji country and himself remained in Maharashtra<sup>2</sup>.

Mysore came into contact with the Marathas during the rule of Shivaji! The appointment of Harji Mahadik to regulate the

affairs of South India, Harji's war with Mysore over the question of Trichinopoly, Sambhaji's devastating Karnatak expeditions in 1682 and 1686 and Ekoji's disposal of Bangalore to the highest bidder, were some of the factors which brought the Mysore Raja and the Marathas closer, and although their relations were not bitter, the traditional policy of hostility continued between the two powers. Bangalore principality wielded a great influence on young Sambhaji. Before his enthronement in Maharashtra in 1680, Sambhaji, had remained in Mysore. Several inscriptions found in Mysore State throw a flood of light on the activities of Sambhaji in Mysore<sup>3</sup>. These inscriptions suggest that Sambhaji had spent the early part of his life in Mysore state as the Governor of Kolar and Chickballapur and that he was in the know of the Mysore politics. Chickadevaraya, who had reduced a number of territories in Tumkur district, was not able to extend his incursions into Bangalore, Kolar and Chickballapur, because of the presence of Sambhaji. As Chickadevaraya was not able to extend his incursions into Bangalore principality no event of any serious nature had happened between the Mysore Raja and Sambhaji before 1680.

Hiraji-Raja was the sole master of the Maratha possessions in South India. He also followed the policy of traditional

hostility towards Mysore. From Gingee, his capital, he extended his scheme of conquest and laid siege to the fort of Dharmapuri to the east of Mysore. The Mysore army resisted the siege which continued for eight months and Hirji, Dadaji, Jaibaji and other generals who persisted in their resolve to take the fort were, at last, repulsed with heavy slaughter. Undeterred by this, they went and took up their stand in Sanugaminapattam (Southern Dharmapuri). Even from there they were pursued by the Mysore army<sup>4</sup>. The war between Hirji and Mysore came to a close in December 1681. The relations between the Marathas and Mysore were further strained over the Trichinopoly issue till 1681. Trichinopoly was under the control of Madura, but after 1681 it became the disputed territory between Mysore and Madura. Both parties began to use all their arts and policy to restrain the other to annex it. Chokkanatha-Nayak of Madura was unable to annex it. Since 1678, Chokkanatha Nayak was growing weak and his commander Rustam Khan had taken over the power and had began to look down upon the Nayak family. He approached the marwans and Chickadevaraja of Mysore for help. Chickadevaraja despatched his army under the command of Kumaraiya, apparently to put down Rustan Khan and relieve Chokkantha from his anxiety, but in reality, to procure a truly political picture of Madura and try

with all possible means the reduction of Trichinopoly<sup>5</sup>. The Mysore palace record mentions that Chickadevaraja commissioned Kumaraiya to Madura for the purpose of exacting arrears of tribute from Chokknatha since 1677<sup>6</sup>. This indicates that since 1677 the Nayak family of Madura had been tributary to Mysore. But Chokkanatha had not been a tributary of Mysore. So the information given in the palace record is not reliable. On the contrary Wilks and the Jesuit letter of 1682, states that the objective in undertaking an expedition to Madura was the conquest of the territories<sup>7</sup>. The Jesuit letter states "Kumar Raja the Mysore general attached Trichinopoly with a strong army"<sup>8</sup>.

On the receipt of the news, Rustom Khan advanced to Trichinopoly and fell upon the Mysore army, but was repulsed with heavy slaughter. He lost all his horses, unable to encounter the Mysore army further, Rustom Khan returned to the capital, where Chokknatha hatched a plot which brought about the end of the Commander<sup>9</sup>. Chokkanatha was freed from Rustom Khan's tyranny and was grateful to Mysore for her timely help. Chokkanatha wrote to the Governor of Madras "we and the Naique are good friends"<sup>10</sup>. But this friendship was a short lived one because Mysore helped Chokkanatha not to save him but take Trichinopoly. Kumariya after the ruin of Rustom Khan, gained

the upperhand. Realizing the precarious position of Chokkanatha, Kumariya demanded the surrender of Trichinopoly to Mysore; Chokkanatha was greatly annoyed at this and formed a confederacy consisting of Ekoji of Tanjore, Hirji of Gingee and the Maravans. Among these confederates the Marathas were not sincere at heart. They joined the confederacy "on the pretext of defending their sovereign but this object was to get their share of pillage". The advance of Mysore as far as Madura and Trichinopoly, during 1678-80, had become a source of anxiety to the Marathas. Secondly Harji, Dadoji and Jaitagi and other Maratha generals intervened in the affairs of Mysore in 1681 and actually laid siege to Dharampuri and Samiyanini-pattan but they had been put to rout by the Mysore army. Since then the Marathas had been waiting for an opportunity to check the aggression of Mysore<sup>12</sup>. Thirdly the Marathas were aware of the unjust demands of Trichinopoly by Mysore. They were eager to retain Trichinopoly for Madura so that there could be no trouble to their possessions from Mysore. Cessation of Trichinopoly to Mysore would mean the outbreak of constant friction between the Mysoreans and the Marathas because Trichinopoly, Tanjore and Gingee were not far away from one another. Ekoji had a strong reason to join Chokkanatha against Mysore. His prime minister had been defeated and humiliated by Chikkadevaraya in the battle

of Hosur<sup>13</sup>. Lastly at no time in the 17th century had the rulers of Mysore and the Marathas remained as friends. One's adversity had been another's opportunity. Therefore, the Marathas proceeded on the pretence of helping Chokkanatha, but their real motive was to repulse the army of Mysore whose proximity they feared<sup>14</sup>. If the repulse of the Mysore army from Trichinopoly was the ultimate object of the Marathas, the intention of Mysore was to uproot the Marathas from Tanjore and Gingee and revive the ancient Nayak family there<sup>15</sup>. Thus Trichinopoly became the bone of contention between Mysore and the Marathas.

Disturbed by the alliance of the Marathas at Trichinopoly, Kumariyya realised that it was not wise to resist such armies with troops inferior in number. He therefore conceived two plans. The first plan which he tried with Chokkanatha was that he offered peace to the Nayak promising to preserve his kingdom for him, and "to reestablish his succession of the ancient Nayak family at Tanjore and Gingee". By this first plan Kumaraiyya wished to create confidence in Chokkanatha about the preservation of his kingdom and by the second plan he wished to isolate Chokkanatha from the Maratha combination on the pretext of reviving the ancient family at Tanjore and Gingee. Chokkanatha did not agree. He could easily infer that it was a deception to

trap him. The Jusuit letter of 1682 comments, "Undoubtedly the wisest course would have been to make a league with the King of Mysore to chase the Marathas<sup>16</sup>". The observation of Andre Triere is difficult to agree with because Chokkanatha could not trust the ruler of Mysore for several reasons. First, Chikkadevaraja had annexed Andiya and Kumarathin situated on the frontiers guarding dominions of Madura and had humiliated Gatta Mudaliyar the ally of Chokkanatha. Then he had directed his marches towards Erode and taken it by reducing Akka-Reddi its ruler<sup>17</sup>. Andre Triere himself writes "The King of Mysore entered (these regions) without striking a blow and took possession of the only fortress which Madura had preserved till then in the north<sup>18</sup>. Secondly smarting under the tyranny of Rustan Khan, Chokkanatha had appealed to Mysore for help in order to free himself. Chikkadevaraya had sent his Delvoy-Kumarriya to help him. Kumariyya had gone to Trichinopoly, resisted Rustam Khan, brought about his ruin and freed Chokkanatha. Taking advantage of this situation, Kumaraiyya had demanded the surrender of Trichinopoly. This Chokkanatha could not do<sup>19</sup>. Lastly, it was to defeat the designs of Kumariyya that the confederacy was formed. Chokkanatha had from his own stand point, followed a wise policy of allying himself with the Marathas against Mysore. Otherwise he had to surrender Trichinopoly to Mysore as was demanded by Kumariyya.

Having failed in his first plan against Chokkanatha, Kumariyya tried his second plan against Harji.

He persuaded Harji to withdraw from the field of action by holding out prospects of booty. Kumariyya offered him large sums of money to corrupt his fidelity and pledge him to retire to Gingee. In restoring to this diplomacy Kumarriyya wanted to gain time, to enable Chikkadevaraya of Mysore, to send him help, which he had applied for. But his letter fell into the hands of his rivals. They had kept away these despatches and worked to bring about the ruin of the general<sup>20</sup>. Even this plan also failed. Kumaraeyya's tact and diplomacy misfired. The enemies of Mysore allowed, Harji and other Maratha generals, to study the policy of Kumarayya towards them, Kumarayya's offer of friendship with Chokkanatha, his revival of ancient Nayak's rule at Tanjore and Gingee, his insistence with the Marathas to withdraw from Trichinopoly, his holding of prospects of booty to them and his select correspondence with the ruler of Mysore for additional reinforcements, convinced Harji that, Kumaraiyya had been, slowly and steadily, working to bring about a retaliatory measure much more severe than that adopted by the Mysoreans. He decided to attack Srirangapatana itself. The policy pursued by Kumariyya at Trichinopoly had a

tremendous effect on the attitude of the Marathas towards Mysore. Hitherto the Marathas had been intent on securing the retreat of the Mysore army away from Trichinopoly, apparently because they feared their proximity. But now their policy was to secure the possession of Srirangapatan itself.

Realising the critical position of Kumariyya, Harji despatched his Maratha generals like Jaitaji Katkar, Dadaji Kakade, Nimbalkar and others to effect the conquest of Srirangapattan<sup>21</sup>. Harji expected that since the bulk of the Mysore army was at Trichinopoly the Maratha generals would secure the conquest of Srirangapatan easily. But his expectations went wrong. The three generals made a sudden dash into the country at Kottakarai and Kasaldurga in Mandya districts<sup>22</sup>. Disturbed by the presence of the Marathas Chikkadevaraya sent word to Kumariyya, desiring him to send the army to face the Marathas<sup>23</sup>. At the instance of Chikkadevaraja, Doddayya, selected three thousand oxen, fastened to their horns lighted torches, and allowed them to move in the direction of the Maratha camps in the dead of night. The Marathas were terror striken at the approach of the oxen. Battles were fought and the Marathas were put to rout, admist great loss. Dadaji, Jaitaji and Nimbalkar were captured and

their heads cut off<sup>24</sup>. The defeat of the Marathas was sketched in the inscription of 1686. Chikkadevaraja subdued Dadaji, Jaitaji and other Marathas at Panchavati. Having slain Dadaji, having cut off all their limbs and slit the noses Chikkadevaraja set forth for war. Tirimalraya writes, "as Chikkadevaraja had exterminated Jaitagi Dadaji and other Maratha generals, he came to be respected by all as God Narayana".

Having heard of the tragic news of the Marathas, Harji Mahadik proceeded to deal with Kumarayya violently. Kumaraiyya receiving neither reinforcements nor reply to his letters was obliged to seek safety in honourable retreat. He took flight towards Mysore with all his army unnoticed by the Marathas, but the Jesuit letter says, "the Marathas would not allow themselves on the wrong scent, for a long time past, their self conceit and audacity had been increasing by the inaction of Kumaraiyya which revealed to them, his weakness and their strength; they kept close to his army and as a consequence of his actions could escape them<sup>26</sup>". This account, based on Jesuit letters, is contradicted by Jedhe Shakavali. The Marathas captured two hundred horses and also the commander - Komaraiyya of Srirangapatna<sup>27</sup>. The fact that Jaitaji Katkar, Dadaji Kakade also took part in the campaign needs

clarification. If Dadaji and others went at the instance of Harji to Mysore for the conquest of Srirangapatan, were captured and cut to pieces and their heads hung on the fort walls of Srirangapatan by Doddajiyya, the documents, as G.S. Sardesai puts it, may be incorrect yet there are evident minute mistakes which one can detect<sup>28</sup>. It is true that Harji Mahadik conducted the operations at Trichinopoly capturing at the same time, Kumariyya, the commander of the Mysore army; but it is incorrect to say that Dadji and Jaitaji too participated in that campaign. The Jedhes who resided at Kari near Bhor some 30 miles south of Poona, had recorded the event which happened at Trichinopoly. The long distance might have prevented them from having a correct fact of the event. The Jesuit letter of 1682 says "The defeat and capture of the general (Kumaraiyya), till then, invincible, completed the joy and pride of Arasamalai<sup>29</sup>". Having vanquished such an invincible commander Harji Mahadik expelled all the Mysoreans of Madura and proved himself a worthy Maratha general to rule over the distant region<sup>30</sup>. Sambhaji might have, in a way, felt very happy for his action in removing Rahanath Narayan from Gingee and by bringing in his place, Harji Mahadik.

Kumaraiyya and Harji Mahadik were remarkable generals. In tactics, one excelled the other. If Kumariayya believed

that he was well versed in military warfare Harji showed the practical demonstration of his superiority in the field of action. The two generals were persons of high ability but with different in character. Harji had an inborn genuis for handling large bodies of troops spread over a wide areas, changing his tactics so as to take prompt advantage of every change in the enemy's plans, and movements. He knew well that delay was always dangerous. Taking advantage of the inactivity of the Mysore army he attacked them from every direction and inflicted a crushing defeat on them by capturing the commander himself. Above all, he had also the support of a well equipped army, in addition to the plentiful supply of provisions.

Whereas the Mysore general was denied of these advantages, as Kumaraiyya sent a major portion of his army to Mysore at the instance of Chikkadevaraja. The remaining army was not sufficient to combat the Marathas. Further his letter of request, for reinforcements, fell into enemy's hands which hastened to ruin such a plan, to effect an honourable retreat, from that dangerous place and in pursuit by the enemies, his plan was defeated when the enemies attacked him.

A letter of 1682, mentions him, as "unvincible" general. He fought for the glory of Mysore. His ingenuity in military

equipment dragged him to be a captive in the hands of the Marathas. Harji Mahadik, on the other hand, was disloyal to his master. The hour of his victory was the hour of his vindictiveness.

The consequences of the Trichinopoly war were, that Harji Mahadik grew powerful in the eastern part of South India. With individual power, and practically as almost an independent sovereign. Sarkar rightly observes "The Maratha King's absorption in vice, the powerful predominance of the favourite Kavi Kalusha in his council, the consequent disorder in the Kingdom, and the increasing Mughal pressure in Maharashtra under the personal direction of Aurangzeb, tended to extinguish Sambhaji's authority in the far of province of Gingee, making the local viceroy his own master<sup>31</sup>. He gave up the practice of submitting the annual account of the revenue to his sovereign, at Raigrah<sup>32</sup>. Thus Harji began to rule the eastern part of South India as an independent sovereign. Fortunately for him, there was no fear of Mysore as all the Mysoreans were expelled from the region of Madura after the war of Trichinopoly.

Chikkadvaraja's victory over the Marathas near Srirangapatan appeared to counterbalance Kumariyya's reverses at Trichinopoly. Chikkadevaraja delivered a rude shock to the Maratha's dream of taking possession of Srirangapatan. In fact the Marathas were

prevented from having a permanent foot-hold in and near Mysore. The Kannada sources, the palace record of Apratima-Vira-Charitam and the Sakala Vaidyas Somhita, exaggerate the achievements of Chikkadevaraja. The former source mentions, that Chikkadevaraja as viceroy over the Marathas, apart from spreading his fame far and wide, had also delighted no less a ruler than Aurangazeb, the Mughal Emperor, whose efforts to capture these leaders proved futile when they made an attack on his capital previous to their arrival in South India<sup>33</sup>. Apratima-Vira-Charitam, says that Chikkadevaraja brightened up the fame of South India by throwing out the Marathas from his Kingdom<sup>34</sup>. The defeated Marathas said to themselves that "because they had roused the wrath of Chikkadevaraja, they had lost the chances of making a permanent settlement, and convert his kingdom into a stage, for the Goddess of Victory<sup>35</sup>". It is clear that the sources have, glorified the exploits of Chikkadevaraja, while estimating the position of him in South India on the evidence of the Kannada sources, the greatness of Harji Mahadik as a remarkable general of the age, cannot be overlooked. Harji had defeated no less an invincible general than Kumaiyya and upheld the greatness of the Marathas in the South. On the whole he was one of the greatest generals of the time.

Sambhaji launched his Mysore expedition in 1682, among the many campaigns that fill the stormy reign of Sambhaji, his campaigns against Mysore, may rightly be assigned, the pride of place. It was the third trial of strength, between Mysore and the Marathas. There were certain causes for his invasion of Mysore. First, from a letter of Fort St. George, dated 10th December 1681, it is possible to infer that the South had acknowledged the suzerainty<sup>36</sup> of Sambhaji. Second, Sambhaji had an ideal of uniting all the Hindus against the north<sup>37</sup>. Third, from the study of the Political situation in South India, it could be gathered that, merciless slaughter of three Maratha generals Jaibaji, Dadaji and Nimbalkar by Chikkadevaraja Srirangapatan had not escaped the attention of Sambhaji. Lastly Harji Mahadik drove out the Mysoreans, from almost all the citadels, which they had taken from Madura, in the recent war but the Mysoreans withstood all the attacks of the Marathas, who had allied themselves with the marwans and tried to retain their northern territories. The Jesuit letter of 1682 says : 'the latter (Mysoreans) still possess some fortresses among others that of Madura, with the help of the marwans<sup>38</sup>'. Naturally the disturbing activities of the Mysoreans in the region of Madura must have provoked Sambhaji to adopt regeorous measures to throw them out of that region.

While launching forth, the South Indian expedition, Sambhaji was perhaps, well convinced of the military skill and diplomacy of Chikkadevaraja as he had stayed in the South for long. Kannada sources, both literary and epigraphic and Jesuit letter, are emphatic in saying that Sambhaji formed a triple alliance, consisting of himself, the Sultan of Golconda and the Nayak of Ikkeri, to deal with the Mysore ruler. This makes us believe, that Sambhaji, realised the futility of fighting an enemy, much stronger than himself, single handed, and that too at a distant place. Anyway, Apratima-Viracharitam says that, Sambhaji entered into an alliance, with Basappa Nayak of Ikkeri and Qutbshah of Golconda against the ruler of Mysore<sup>39</sup>. This is confirmed by the Jesuit letter of 1682; "He (Sambhaji) is helped by the (Ikkarian) of the king of Canara and King of Mysore, who is regarded as the common enemy"<sup>40</sup>. Epigraphic record, also speaks of Sambhaji's alliance with the Nayak of Ikkeri and the Shah of Golconda<sup>41</sup>. Being supported by the allies in men and materials, Sambhaji proceeded on his southern campaign and ultimately encamped at Banvara, north west of Mysore<sup>42</sup>. The unexpected approach of the combined armies took Chikkadevaraja by surprise. Nevertheless he rose to the occasion and ordered his entire army to move and fall upon

the enemies. The result was a bloody battle between the two armies in which the allies were ultimately defeated and driven out. This took place in June 1682. The victory of Chikkadevaraja over his enemies was described in epigraphic and literary sources. The Srirangapatan inscription says that Shambu (Sambhaji) failed in his purpose and the Ikkeri Nayak was disgraced<sup>43</sup>. The inscription gives the details, that like an animal in the forest, at the sight of the lion or tiger, so did Shambu, Shah and Baswa, sink down in terror and roll on the ground at the sight of Chikkadevaraja, as if he were himself, the terrible Narasimha<sup>44</sup>. Another inscription of Srirangapatan, dated 1722, confirms what is stated above, Shambu's valour came to a stop, Kutuba-Shah lost all hope, and Ikkeri Basava was disgraced, when mighty Chikkadevaraja set forth for war<sup>45</sup>. Ofcourse this inscription is of a later date. The value of this inscription cannot be dismissed on the ground, that it is not a contemporary inscription; since the event and style are sketched almost on the same model as in the case of Srirangapatan inscription of 1686 the value of the source of information for Sambhaji's fight with Chikkadevaraja cannot be minimised. As to the literary source, Apratima-Vir-Charitam, Chikkadevaraja a mighty ruler that he was, had crushed the pride of Sambhaji, the son of Shivaji<sup>46</sup>.

It was exactly at this time that Ekoji arrived at Banvara, with an army to help Sambhaji. But he was also defeated by Chikkadevaraja<sup>47</sup>. Thus all the attempts made by the Marathas to overwhelm the Mysore army proved futile. The far reaching consequences, of this battle of Banvara, were that, they marked the boundary limits between the two Kingdoms of Mysore and Bednur, they prevented the Marathas from making headway in the direction of Mysore; they increased the prestige of Chikkadevaraja, as the foremost ruler of South India, and further showed no hope of accommodation or cordiality in the relationship between Mysore and Maharashtra. The traditional hostility between the two powers continued; no one attempted to narrow down his differences with the other with the result that the relations between the two were greatly strained.

Frustrated in their attempt to subdue the enemy, the allies shifted the theatre of war from Banvara to Trichinopoly. In doing so Sambhaji counted upon the help of Harji Mahadik, the Governor of Gingee, further, Tanjore and Gingee were the strong Maratha centres. Sambhaji might have believed, that by going over there he could get all the military requirements from these places, to carry on the war. The two armies marched and encamped at Trichinopoly, a strong place to carry on the

war from. The political condition in Madura was worse. Realising the distressing position of Chokkanatha Nayak of Madura, Sambhaji resorted to exactions and brigandages which dislocated the country and hastened the death of Chokkanatha. The Jesuit letter of 1682 says : "The Nayak (Chokkanatha) attacked by Sambhaji, in his fortress of Trichinopoly, fell into a fit of melancholy which caused his death"<sup>48</sup>. This occurred on 6th June 1682. He was too weak of control the deteriorating position of Madura. Added to this Harji Mahadik was still chasing the Mysoreans from their important stronghold in Madura. Ekoji too inaugurated his despotic rule and subscribed to the worsening political situation of Madura. He taxed the people heavily and treated them inhumanly. Thus the disturbing activities of Sambhaji, Harji Mahadik and Ekoji, in the south were, knotty problems for Mysore. It roused Chikkadevaraja to a lively sense of danger to the Mysore outposts, in the region of Madura. Mysore had no ally. Chikkadevaraja could not count upon the help of the Madura ruler, because the new ruler Muthu Virappa Nayak was weak and a puppet in his hands of the Marathas. On the other hand Sambhaji was strengthened by the armies, not only of his old allies, Basappa Nayak of Ikkeri and Qutb Shah of Golconda, but also his own people Harji Mahadik and Ekoji. In this perilous

hour, Chikkadevaraja, appealed to Aurangzeb, then at Aurangabad, for military, help. The Jesuit letter of 1682 says "It is said that the Mughal at the request of Mysore is sending a formidable army against Sambhaji"<sup>49</sup>. The expected help from the Mughals, was involved in a serious struggle, and did not come. Perhaps, Aurangzeb could not pay much attention to the affairs of Mysore, as he himself, was involved in a serious struggle with Bijapur<sup>50</sup>. It is well known that Aurangzeb descended into the Deccan with a definite objective of uprooting the Marathas<sup>51</sup>. When Chikkadevaraja appealed to him for help, Aurangzeb could have conveniently befriended him as a faithful ally and helped so as to overcome the menace of the Marathas. A timely pact, with the ruler of Mysore, would have helped him to consider that, there was one sincere ally, who could check the onrush of the Marathas in South India<sup>52</sup>. But Aurangzeb missed the opportunity, as he was occupied with the reduction of Bijapur<sup>53</sup>.

Chikkadevaraja had to face the situation, created by the Marathas, in the region of Madura single handed. He (Sambhaji) had several of the fortresses, all the provinces of Dharmapuri, and other neighbouring territories. Sambhaji occupied several fortresses in the northern provinces of Madura, that belonged to Mysore<sup>54</sup>. The presence of Sambhaji in the South, affected

the interests of Madura as well. Madura was divided into five portions of the warring and mutually jealous powers. The Jesuit letter of 1683 gives a heart-rendering picture of the political conditions of Madura. "The ancient kingdom of Madura is in-shreds. The Nayak keeps a small portion of it, another is occupied by the King of Mysore, a third by the petty king of Marve, a fourth by Sambhaji and lastly a fifth by Ekoji"<sup>55</sup>. It was a fine opportunity for Sambhaji for a dispute with the King of Mysore for his claim of supremacy in South India. He exploited the situation and recommenced his aggression against Mysore from the east and the South. The aggressive attitude of the Marathas is clearly stated in the Jesuit letter of that year, "the power of the king of Mysore begins to grow weak because violently attacked in his own dominions by the troops of Sambhaji he cannot sustain and reinforce the armies he had sent to those countries. The provinces he had conquered there shake off his yoke gradually or become attached to someone of the princes who have partitioned to shreds of the kingdom once so flourishing among themselves"<sup>56</sup>. This letter brings out clearly that Mysore could not maintain her position of ascendancy over the conquered regions of Madura especially with the advent of Sambhaji and his allies. The half subjugated vasals gave up paying allegiance to Mysore and

asserted their independence. Realising the futility of further resistance, Chikkadevaraja, honorably entered into negotiations with Sambhaji and thus brought the war to a close by paying him tribute<sup>57</sup>.

The conclusion of the war was a great relief to Chikkadevaraja. At no time had he experienced such stress and strain. The Maratha policy of exaction of tribute, made Chikkadevaraja's scheme of conquest in the South, checked for the time being. His influence in the northern region of Madura began to grow weak as a result of Sambhaji's war with Mysore<sup>58</sup>, Sambhaji who had suffered defeat at Banavara changed the theatre of war to Trichinopoly and overwhelmed the Mysore army. His success heightened up the Maratha prospects of supremacy in the South. Naturally the differences in view points between Mysoreans and the Marathas widened and their relations went from bad to worse. The far-reaching consequences of the Maratha war was that, Chikkadevaraja, was driven to make friendship with the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. Chikkadevaraja-Binappam suggests that "it was at the invitation of Chikkadevaraja that Aurangzeb descended to the South and conquered Bijapur and Golconda". The mighty Chikkadevaraja, well-versed in diplomacy, secured the surrender of the two powerful kingdoms of Bijapur and Golconda to the Mughal

emperor Aurangzeb whom he had invited. It is not quite likely that Aurangzeb arrived in the Deccan because of Chikkadevaraja. Chikkadevaraja joined Aurangzeb for his own advantages. There was no powerful chieftain in South India against the Marathas. Basappa Nayak of Ikkeri was the ally of the Marathas<sup>59</sup>, Chokkanatha Nayak died in June. He was succeeded by his son Muthevirappa Nayak<sup>60</sup>. He was weak and a puppet in the hands of Madanna. Thus the interests of Mysore in the region of Madura were hampered. Harji Mahadik was still ruling the people of Mysore from his important strong holds in Madura. Ekoji was up in arms against Mysore. Under these circumstances, Chikkadevaraja was left with no other alternative but to win the support of Aurangzeb. Chikkadevaraja had only entered into a treaty with the Marathas as his subsequent attitude reveals.

Aurangzeb set his eye on the conquest of Bijapur and Golconda, according to Kannada sources, to reduce them. He felt that, Bijapur and Golconda, were at the back of Sambhaji's insubordination to the Mughal emperor, and unless they were reduced, Sambhaji would not submit to Mughal authority. What, Aurangzeb thought was quite true. Sambhaji invaded Mysore in close cooperation with the Sultan of Golconda in 1682 and therefore they were on good terms<sup>61</sup>. Sikandar-Shah, the Bijapur Sultan, had offended Aurangzeb by writing a spirited letter in

1684. This letter made Aurangzeb think that Bijapur and Golconda were the two great obstacles in the way of destroying Sambhaji. Aurangzeb conducted the siege of Bijapur fort with all his vigour and on 13th September 1686 he saw the fall of Bijapur monarchy. This was followed by the reduction of Golconda on 21st September 1687<sup>62</sup>. During the siege of the fortress, Chikkadevaraja's army was present. The assistance rendered by Chikkadevaraja to Aurangzeb, though it looked meagre, its importance cannot be minimised. Aurangzeb could count upon Chikkadevaraja as his ally, in arresting the progress of the Marathas in the South. Chikkadevaraja gained a more advantageous position by helping Aurangzeb. He rose in the estimation of his enemies, particularly, the Marathas.

However, Chikkadevaraja's friendship with the Mughal, aggravated the situation. Sambhaji took the offensive and invaded the kingdom of Mysore in 1686; when Aurangzeb was involved in the war against the Sultan of Bijapur, Sambhaji projected his southern expedition. Kavi Kalasha, the chief adviser in the Maratha court wielded a great influence on Sambhaji; the Kannada source says that Kavi Kalasha was the spy of Aurangzeb but the truth of the statement cannot be established unless it is corroborated by other evidence.

E. S. Waring and the Jesuit letter of 1686 and Chikkadevaraja Binappam, are the main source for Sambhaji's war with Chikkadevaraja. E. S. Waring writes "Sambhaji in 1686 was engaged against the forts and districts belonging to Bijapur government in South India"<sup>63</sup>. This means that Sambhaji was occupied with the conquest and territories in the Karnataka Bijapuri Balaghat in 1686.

The Jesuit letter of 1686 speaks of the atrocious war of Sambhaji in the heart of the Mysore kingdom<sup>64</sup>. The reasons for this were; firstly since Chikkadevaraja sent the bulk of his army to Bijapur in the support of the Mughals, most of his forts and districts were defenceless<sup>65</sup>. Secondly Chikkadevaraja's power in Madura was growing weak. Several chieftains in the northern region of Madura began to shake off their yoke of Mysore<sup>66</sup>. Thirdly Chikkadevaraja had violated the terms of the treaty of 1683 by not paying tribute due to Sambhaji.

Taking advantage of the situation, Sambhaji invaded Mysore. His task of conducting the war, was further facilitated, by the revolts by the inhabitants against their own sovereign. The chieftains of Marasa, Tigula, Kodaga and Malayala helped Sambhaji against Chikkadevaraja. They were lured by Sambhaji's promise of booty and honour<sup>67</sup>. With these allies, at the head,

Sambhaji attacked Srirangapatn, the very heart of the Mysore Kingdom, and began to conduct war against Chikkadevaraja mercilessly<sup>68</sup>. Chikkadevaraja faced two problems. One was the problem of the army and the other was the problem of money to meet the expenses of the war. He recalled his army from the citadel of Madura, but Sambhaji sent his troops and held up the Mysore army<sup>69</sup>. The atrocious war which Sambhaji conducted in the province of Mysore prevented Chikkadevaraja from sending reinforcements of his army which was shut up in Madura. However, he despatched 10,000 pagodas to its relief<sup>70</sup>. At the request of Chikkadevaraja, the Manavas helped the Mysore army to return to Mysore. About the problem of money, Chikkadevaraja resorted to "exactions and cruelties" in the eastern provinces of these dominions<sup>71</sup>. The Jesuit account says "Somehow put down the rebellion with a strong hand"<sup>72</sup>. While laying siege to the fort of Srirangapatn, the troops of Sambhaji ravaged the kingdom of Mysore, Chikkadevaraja defended the fort ably. Chikkadevaraja Binnappan says "in the fight that followed the chieftains of Marasa, Tigula, Kodaga and Malyala, countries who advanced against Chikkadevaraja depending on the promise of the Marathas, were defeated and pursued"<sup>73</sup>. The allies were so badly routed that the same Kanada source mentions "Sambhaji was drowned in the sea of fear at the approach of Chikkadevaraja". Having suffered defeat, Sambhaji retreated to

his homeland of the Kallons<sup>74</sup> Sambhaji hurried back to Poona because he feared Aurangzeb might invade Panhala.

The consequences of the Maratha was with Mysore were that the differences between the two were strained further. The most disastrous consequence was, that it paved the way, for Ekoji of Tanjore, to dispose off Bangalore, to Chikkadevaraja.

Thus the two wars that Sambhaji fought with Chikkadevaraja first in 1682 and then in 1686 were suicidal to the interests of the Marathas. In his first war of 1682 Sambhaji was defeated at Banavara by the Mysore army but he withdrew to Trichinopoly; where he conducted a further atrocious war, and with the support of Harji Mahadik, he had expelled the Mysoreans from the northern regions of Madura. The hostility of 1682 terminated with the conclusion of a treaty. Chikkadevaraja had agreed to the treaty, only in his distress, but he never fulfilled it. This war reduced the power of Mysore in Madura. The second war of 1686 went against the Maratha interests in Mysore. Sambhaji was defeated and pursued. Consequently his relations with Mysore were greatly strained. Neither the Mysoreans nor the Marathas tolerated the existence of the other, each worked to bring about the ruin of the other.

Sambhaji's defeat at Banawara was the most disastrous event experienced by the Marathas. His defeat was compensated by the subsequent success in Madura. In offering to end the war and in proposing to pay tribute Chikkadevaraja exhibited rare qualities of statesmanship. These efforts indicate his consciousness that Sambhaji was no ordinary invader. The second Maratha war had crushed the pride of the chieftains of Morasa, Tigala, Kodaga, Malyala regions and affected Maratha interests in South India. Their defeat at Srirangapatan increased the prestige of Chikkadevaraja. He declared himself the emperor of South India. On the whole the relations between Chikkadevaraja and Sambhaji were strained and this continued hostility between the two in South India, made Mughal intervention in South India inevitable. Besides the success that attended the Mysore army in the second war made Ekoji dispose off Bangalore.

Two factors were mainly responsible for Ekoji's disposing off Bangalore. They were the internal troubles and the external danger. Ekoji was not popular among his subjects because of his tyranical rule. He plundered his own men and appropriated all the income of temples including their richest possessions. The Jesuit letter of 1682 says that "after plundering his men he (Ekoji) has fallen on his own idols and appropriated the treasures of the pagodas and their large possession"<sup>75</sup>. Indeed,

to this unwise policy, the nature has brought horrible ravages on the sea-coast because it has been accompanied by a terrible gust of wind. More than 6000 persons perished<sup>76</sup>. Agriculturists were treated unhumanly; taxes were heavy. They were to be paid both in cash and kind. Thus the economic condition of the people went from bad to worse under the rule of Ekoji<sup>77</sup>.

The external danger was that his kingdom was subjected to the thieves, the Manavas, the king of Mysore and the Nayak of Madura<sup>78</sup>. Of all the powers, Mysore troubled him most. Chikkadevaraja, freed from the fear of the Marathas, projected his campaign of conquest. During April and May 1687, he seized the principal Maratha possessions namely Chickanayakar-Halli Kandikere, Jamagondlur and incorporated them into his kingdom<sup>79</sup>. The fall of these places, roused Ekoji, to a full sense of danger to his richest possessions from the extension of the Mysore kingdom in that direction. These acquisitions, no doubt, meant the weakening of Ekoji's power in the Karnatak, Bijapur and Balaghat. The increasing power and influence of Chikkadevaraja made, Ekoji, realize that it was very difficult for him to control his distant Bangalore principality. So he decided to dispose it off to the highest bidder. Wilks believes that Ekoji decided to sell away Bangalore because he thought controlling of a distant place was a costly affair<sup>81</sup>. According to the palace records, Chikkadevaraja's principal successful expedition to

Madura and Trichinopoly persuaded Ekoji to think, that he, was no match to Chikkadevaraja. Therefore he decided to sell Bangalore<sup>82</sup>. It was not so much the desire, to be on good terms with the king of Mysore, as the hostile surroundings in the midst of which, Ekoji lived, that made the latter to decide to sell away Bangalore.

In the meanwhile, the fall of Bijapur into Mughal hands in September 1686, and the imminent seige of Golconda awakened Sambhaji, to the danger of his possessions in South India, by the extension of Mughal authority in that direction. As a defensive measure, Sambhaji sent Keshav Pingle and Sambhaji Ghorpade with 12000 horses southwards in October 1686 to strengthen his garison in the South<sup>83</sup>.

This measure of Sambhaji, seems to have Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb detach a large army from the seige of Golconda to invade Bangalore, which was still in Marathas hands. Aurangzeb was confident of his success, because Basavapatam a principal centre of Maratha activities was already ceded by Qutb Shah of Golconda to Aurangzeb, at the beginning of 1677<sup>84</sup>. It appears that Aurangzeb was determined to conquer the Maratha possession in the South one after another, The Mughal detachment, sent under Kasim Khan, proceeded towards south where the Maratha army

that had already gone under Keshav Pant and Sambhaji was positioned. On 1st March 1687, the Mughal army marched by way of Penukonda towards Tumkur<sup>85</sup>. Leaving Tumkur to Chikkadevaraja, Ekoji through a vakil, opened negotiations on the question of selling Bangalore and agreed to transfer the city for a sum of three lakhs of rupees. After the transactions and after taking possession of the city, he hoisted the imperial flag on the ramparts of Bangalore fort on 10th July 1687<sup>86</sup>. Almost simultaneously the Marathas with a detachment under Harji Mahadik (Governor of Gingee) Keshav Pant and Santeji came and encamped at Bangalore<sup>87</sup>.

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As to the point, as to who won the victory, sources display conflicting versions. First, the palace records state that Chikkadevaraja fought a severe battle with Kasim Khan and that after defeating the enemy completely, he took this fort of Bangalore on the 14th July 1687<sup>88</sup>. Second, the Maratha Chronicle Jedhe-Shakavali fully corroborates the statement; Ashad Shukla 10 (10th July 1687); Chief of Mysore brought aid to Bangalore and seiged Kasim Khan with forces<sup>89</sup>. Third, Sambhaji Patra-Sara Sangraha says that, Chikkadevaraja, with the help of Harji, defeated Kasim Khan on 10th July 1687<sup>90</sup>. Fourth, Wilks, gives entirely a different version. "The Raja was far too shrewd to attempt any such act. He saw that, the counting on Kasim Khan's friendship would, by far, be the better thing to do, under the

circumstances as it would enable him to put himself in favour with emperor Aurangzeb who had already set an eye on the territories of the Raja<sup>91</sup>. The Raja was not prepared to turn hostile to the Emperor. He had reduced a number of petty chieftains in South India, but there was no protest from the Mughals. He had annexed a number of petty principalities but the Mughals did not object to it. Therefore, there was no reason for him to be on enmical terms with the Mughals. The emperor would be a source of strength to him, as it would enable him, to overcome the turbulent chieftains, whom he had subjugated. On the other hand, the emperor too was not prepared to quarrel with Chikkadevaraja, because his friendship would facilitate the marching of the Mughal army through his territories. So Wilks continues that Chikkadevaraja made common cause with Kasuin Khan and opened negotiations to buy Bangalore from him<sup>92</sup>. Fifth, Sarkar, on the basis of the Persian sources, states that Kasim Khan captured Bangalore with the assistance of Chikkadevaraja the enemy of Shivaji's house<sup>93</sup>. Sixth, Kinciad and Parasnus, say that, Aurangzeb despatched an army to attack Bangalore still in the hands of the Marathas. The straits to which Bangalore were reduced led, Harji Mahadik and Keshav Pingle forget their jealousies and march to its relief, but in August 1687 it fell, before the relieving army reached it<sup>94</sup>. Seventh, colonel Read

says that Kasuin Khan carried fire and sword into the South, dispossessed Bangalore from the Maratha control and took several Hindu Chieftains converting them into Subhas<sup>95</sup>. Now the first three sources agree in stating that Chikkadevaraja won a brilliant victory over Kasuin Khan at Bangalore. This may not be a fact because Chikkadevaraja would not go to the extent of fighting the Mughals who were very strong in the South. Morevoer, according to Chikkadevaraja Binappam, Chikkadevaraja actively supported Aurangzeb, in his attempt to reduce Bijapur and Golconda. How would an ally, bond by mutual understanding and agreement, suddenly fall upon the Mughal general and harbour disloyal feelings? Further, a few years later, Chikkadevaraja sent a goodwill mission under Karnatak-Liagiah to the court of Aurangzeb, which was kindly received and sent back with titles and presents. If Chikkadevaraja, had really committed aggression, against the Mughals, would Auraggzeb, noted for intolerance receive kindly a mission of Mysore and send it back with presents? It is quite likely that Chikkadevaraja realising the seriousness of the situation remained a spectator of the event. Of course, there were more advantages in making common cause with the Mughal general, to Chikkadevaraja, as Wilks believed<sup>96</sup>. He would enlist the love and confidence of the Emperor which

would enable him to threaten the numerous chieftains of the south and secure their submission.

What happened at Bangalore was that by the time Harji and Keshav Pant had arrived at Bangalore, after patching up their differences, Bangalore was already taken by the Mughal generals. Disappointed in their hopes, the two Maratha generals returned to Gingee leaving Kasim Khan the undisputed master of Bangalore. It is held by Kincaid and Parasnus, that Harji returned to Gingee and sent 18000 horses, under his two allies to invade Mysore<sup>97</sup>. This statement contradicts the version, given by Sambhaji-Patrasara Sangraha that, Chikkadevaraja, defeated Kashmair Khan with the help of Harji Mahadik<sup>98</sup>. As the differences between the Mysoreans and the Marathas continued to be wide, there was no likelihood of the two houses coming together for the greater end of south Indian solidarity. Such being the trend of the period, the fact that Chikkadevaraja was being assisted by Harji Mahadik, against the Mughals, does not seem to be correct. However, Kasim Khan on his part thought that the Raja would be of immense use to him as an ally. Further finding that he himself was unable to hold Bangalore, for any length of time, on account of the expedition he had to lead, was prepared to dispose it to the Raja for a consideration of three lakhs of

rupees, which the Raja was still willing to pay<sup>99</sup>, Chikkadevaraja paid the stipulated amount and took Bangalore. This is confirmed by the emperial Gazetteer. "Venkoji had agreed to sell Bangalore for three lakhs of rupees". Kasim Khan first seized it, and then carried out the bargain by pocketing the money himself<sup>100</sup>.

Aurangzeb after the capture of Golconda on 21st September 1687 appointed Kasim Khan the Foujdar of the Karnatak with Sira as his capital<sup>101</sup>.

Two factors, among others, had brought the death of Ekoji. The conquest of Bangalore by Kasuin Khan, and his ultimate sale of the fortress for three lakhs of rupees to the king of Mysore, dealt a death blow to Ekoji. Secondly, Chikkadevaraja conquered the important places like Chickanayakanhalli, Kandikere, and Tyenar Condulur in Mysore. The Mughals on the one side and the Mysoreans on the other, systematically worked out to uproot the Marathas from Mysore. The territorial loses and the troubles within were responsible for the death of Ekoji. But about the date of his death sources give different versions. Jedhe Shakavali says that he died in 1684<sup>102</sup> Orme, mentions that Ekoji was still alive at Tanjore in August 1687<sup>103</sup>. The palace record says that Ekoji

having completed negotiations with Chikkadevaraja of Mysore, regarding the sale of Bangalore, for 3 lakhs of rupees, was about to receive the money from the king of Mysore, exactly at that time Kasim Khan come and occupied Bangalore<sup>104</sup>, hoisting the Mughal flag, on 10th July 1687<sup>105</sup>. Sarkar, places the death of Ekoji in January 1685<sup>106</sup>. The weight of the evidence is in favour of the view, that he died in August 1687.

Like many other Marathas, Ekoji, too followed a policy of hostility towards Mysore. His internal and external difficulties drove him to dispose off Bangalore for a consideration of 3 lakhs of rupees to Chikkadevaraja. But Kasim Khan occupied it and Chikkadevaraja got it from Kasim Khan. Bangalore which had been in Maratha hands since 1638 was occupied by Chikkadevaraja in 1687. The Maratha influence in Mysore was definitely on the wane. Ekoji followed an unwise policy in disposing off Bangalore. He undid the work of his father in the Karnatak; although the foundation of the Tanjore principality, was his contribution, the transference of the principal Maratha principality like Bangalore, to the highest bidder was not an act of wise policy. On the contrary, he could have adopted, conveniently, the policy of his father, namely of

permanently settling at Bangalore and controlling distant provinces by means of appointing Maratha generals.

He failed to do that, on the whole his action showed the weakness of the Maratha policy in the South, and in later years it paved the way for the disappearance of the Maratha influence in Mysore. The Mughal interference, in the affairs of South India, brought a diversion in the Mysore Maratha relations. Chikkadevaraja befriended the Mughals, who also were, bent upon the reduction of the Marathas. However, Ekoji's relations with Mysore were far from friendly.

The purchase of Bangalore by Chikkadevaraja only aggravated the situation. Harji had arrived at Bangalore with a view to resaving the city from falling into the hands of the Mughals, but Kasim Khan had already taken possession of it. This disappointed Harji. Besides the political transference that went on between the Mughals and Chikkadevaraja.. It is known that Aurangzeb was busy in the Deccan with a definite objective of routing out the Marathas. Making friendship, with such an enemy like Chikkadevaraja, was not much liked by Harji. Therefore he dispatched Keshav Pant and Santaji, at the head of 18000 horses, in order to devastate the kingdom of Mysore,

destroy Chikkadevaraja<sup>102</sup>, and reduce it to a Maratha vasalage<sup>108</sup>. Santaji entered and plundered the Mysore territory. A terrible battle was fought between the Mysore army and the Marathas in the neighbourhood of Srirangapatn in which the Marathas were defeated<sup>109</sup>. Highly elated at the success the Mysoreans rediculed the Marathas by saying "Oh Marathas quit Mysore. This place is neither Bhaganagar nor Bijapur for your game of fight"<sup>110</sup>. This is the version we get in the Kannada sources. Grant Duff and the Marathi Riyasat give different versions. Grant Duff maintains that they (the Marathas) entered the country of Mysore, and plundered Mysore before they came into armed conflict with the Mysore army. Harji's action of reducing Mysore received a staggering blow when the Marathas were defeated by Chikkadevaraja<sup>111</sup>. Grant Duff's view that the Marathas remained for several months in the Mysore territory does not seem to be correct because Harji had to defend his Gingee principality against Mughal attacks. The Madras diary of 1687 states that "ten thousand Mughal horses descended to Gingee country commanded by Kasim Khan to war against the Marathas". Therefore Harji was left with no alternative but to recall the Maratha army from Mysore immediately.

The consequences of the Maratha invasion of Mysore was that the relations between the two powers did not improve. The differences between the two powers continued to be wide. Harji followed the traditional policy of hostility towards Mysore. After Ekoji's death, Harji was the principal Maratha general in the south. Working against the Maratha onslaught and with the occupation of Bangalore, his task of protecting the Marathas from Mysore became very difficult. On the whole the policy of hostility between the Mysoreans and the Marathas was neither beneficial nor honourable in that in this quarrel a third party was benefitted, namely the Mughals.

If Bangalore went to the possession of Chikkadevaraja, Dodbalpur and other Maratha centers were occupied by Kasim Khan. An inscription from Dodbalpur says "in the reign of Aurangzeb, Alamgir Badshah, the fort of Ballapur was in the hands of Sambhaji's family. Through the exertions of Kasim Khan, Faujdar of Karnatak province, of the Bijapur Subah, it then passed from the hands of Samadud, son of Sivadud Maratha and came into the possession of the Supreme Government"<sup>112</sup>. Thus the Maratha territories were divided between Chikkadevaraja and Kasim Khan. The Mysore Raja and the Mughals were united to put down the Marathas and confiscate their territorial

business in the south. The Marathas could not survive the shocks of the loss of Bangalore and Doddballapur. The power of the Marathas began to show weakness in the South.

In the two years, 1687 and 1688, Sambhaji was involved in a life and death struggle with Aurangzeb. Nothing particular happened in his relations with Mysore. Harji Mahadik too could not turn his attention towards the affairs of Mysore owing to the Mughal disturbance in the South. Besides this Mughal aggression, Harji had his own project of extending the territories of Gingee. The Madras Diary of December 1687 says "Having advice from the Maratha camp that Maratha forces in the Gingee country under the command of Harji Mahadik upon their March with 2000 horses and 5000 foot with a greater number of pioneers and scaling ladders that they had plundered and taken several towns and committed various other atrocities and that most of the inhabitant left Conjiwaram and other places to secure their personal estates"<sup>113</sup>. Harji never seated in concert with other Maratha generals. Keshav Pant opposed Harji, Orme writes "Harji summoned Keshav Pant to march and reduce the countries to the north of Palar which had just submitted to the Mughals. Keshav is undertaking devastating expedition in the region of Arcot and Conjiwaram, and does not act in concert with the other Maratha generals. Keshav Pant

seems to have refused any connection with them. Harji, sent forward a detachment under the command of two officers, who in a fortnight were in quite possession of Arcot and Conjiwaram and Poonamaller<sup>114</sup>. These conquests naturally did not allow Harji to concentrate on the affairs of Mysore.

Chikkadevaraja followed a consistent policy of conquering the Maratha territories in the south. He launched the expedition at the right time. Harji was occupied with the expedition and the defence of his Gingee principality against Kasim Khan's attacks, whereas Sambhaji was involved in life and death struggle against Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb swore that he would never return to Delhi until he had seen the head of Sambhaji weltering at his feet<sup>115</sup>. Ekoji was succeeded by his son Shahaji II to the throne of Tanjore, but he was not a strong Maratha. Taking advantage of the situation, Chikkadevaraja directed his deputy chief (Gurikara Chickkaraya of San Kagiri) to seige, Hoskote and its dependencies, which were under the control of the Marathas. Accordingly Chikkayya went and occupied the Maratha territories. In November 1688 Chikkadevaraja secured the surrender of Manugonda Durga Manhargandi, Varnarilu and in January 1689 he reduced Dhamapari<sup>116</sup>. These places had been lost to Mysore during Sambhaji's wars, Chikkadevaraja recovered all these Maratha territories and established his

rule over them. Chikkadevaraja was able to reduce these Maratha territories as there was so opposition from the Marathas. Sambhaji could neither pay personal attention to the affairs of the Karnatak nor direct his general Harji to arrest the progress of Mysore because his life was in danger.

Intent upon uprooting the Marathas, Aurangzeb instructed his general Shaik-Nigam to capture Sambhaji who was at Sangameshwar, Lingana Kavi says "Proceeding with rapid marches Shaik-Nigam arrived at Sangameshwar and captured Sambhaji who was playing with a member of girls on the banks of the river at Sangameshwar<sup>117</sup>. This took place on 1st February 1689. Sambhaji and his followers were taken to Aurangzeb. Sambhaji showed disrespect to the emperor and the consequent result was that Aurangzeb ordered the execution of Sambhaji on 11th March 1689<sup>118</sup>. Sambhaji was tortured to death<sup>119</sup>.

The news of Sambhaji's death spread like wild fire. Chikkadevaraja felt that the main obstacles in the way of Mysore, expansion were removed. He invaded Paramati and occupied it in May 1689. At the instance of Chikkadevaraja, his deputy Lingaraja (Gurikara Lingaraja) stayed at Coimbatore, seized Kaveripatan and occupied it in July. Chikkadevaraja reduced Kutidurga (Kurnathura) in September and in the

subsequent month annexed Ananigiri<sup>120</sup>. Harji Mahadik could not resist Chikkadevaraja's aggression, because he had neither sufficient money nor the well disciplined army to cope with the situation. In view of these difficulties, Harji entered into an agreement with Chikkadevaraja, by which Anantgiri remained the Southern limits of Mysore.

Harji did not survive long, to protect the interests of the Marathas, in the South. He passed away in 1689. His death dealt a death-blow to the Maratha interests in the South. The era of Maratha greatness in the South ended. Mysore grew in extent and power. Chikkadevaraja occupied Kengiri, Bevahalli, Birambatti and extended the power of the Mysore zone of influence up to sira, The Mughal centre in the Karnatak<sup>121</sup>.

Chikkadevaraja reached the height of his glory in 1690. He had conquered a number of Maratha strongholds both in the south and the north. He had securely established, in the northern as well as the southern frontiers, of Mysore, and this was the end of the continued struggle with the Marathas, as the 'Apratima-Vira-Charitam' testifies<sup>122</sup>.

Viewed from the angle of the Mysore-Maratha relations, it can be said that, the Mysore Maratha relations had been far from friendly. The bitter hostility between the two powers made the

way for the Mughals to take part in the changing politics of the South. The Mysore-Raja and the Mughals were united to suppress the Marathas in the South, with the result the Maratha power declined in the Karnatak. Had the Mysore-Raja and the Marathas, adjusted their relations, it could have been possible to prevent the Mughal intrusions in the South. But neither of them realised, the value of accommodation in the face of the Mughal danger.

Several factors, widened the gulf between the Marathas and the Mysore-Raja. Chief among them were, Ekoji's attitude towards Mysore, the rule of the local chieftains, the ambition of Harji Mahadik and the ability of the Mysore Raja. First, Ekoji never maintained friendly relations with Mysore. He had come in support of Sambhaji, when the latter launched his Mysore expedition in 1682, but had been defeated and pursued by Chikkadevaraja. He had followed on an unwise policy in disposing off Bangalore. Bangalore was lost to the Marathas in 1687. In doing so Ekoji weakened the Marathas in South India. Chikkadevaraja had purchased Bangalore from Ekoji and had made it a military base for further conquest in the north.

Second, the chieftains of Tigula, Morasa, Coorg and Malayala countries, the Nayak of Ikkeri, and the Qutb-Shah of Golconda spoiled the relations of Sambhaji with the Mysore Raja. They were selfish and unimaginative. They had supported Sambhaji

in his two devastating expeditions and had assisted him thinking that their political position would be improved, but Sambhaji's defeat at the hands of Chikkadevaraja had disappointed them and made their position still worse. They did not work to improve the relations of Sambhaji with Chikkadevaraja.

Third, Harji Mahadik followed a traditional policy of hostility towards Mysore. His attacks on Trichinopoly, his treatment of Kumaraiyya at Trichinopoly, his sending of Dadaji Kakade, Jitaji Katkar and Nimbalkar to attempt the immediate acquisition of Srirangapatna and his subsequent war with Mysore show that he was not prepared to narrow down the differences and accommodate matters with Mysore. His relentless war and mutual rivalry had paved the way for the Mughals to intervene in the affairs of the south.

Last, Chikkadevaraja was an able ruler. He had been wedded both to the camp and the court. He led the army in person to the battle field and conducted military operations. In night-attacks, to surprise the enemies, he was an expert. In war and diplomacy of the period, he had excelled the others. With such an able person the relations could not be smooth. On the whole during the time of Sambhaji, the traditional policy of hostility between the two powers continued unabated. Viewed in the larger interests and the need for friendly relations, the policy of

hostility was neither honourable nor beneficial to either  
of the two states of Mysore and Maharashtra.

Foot Notes on Chapter IV

- 1 J. N. Sarkar, House of Shivaji, p. 219, Calcutta, 1940.
- 2 Daughter of Shivaji by his first wife, married to Harji Mahadik.
- 3 Sen, Foreign Biographies of Shivaji, Calcutta, 1927, Vol. II, pp. 132, 145, 146 and 148.
- 4 AVC No. 109\* ORIMG No. 431.
- 5 Letters of Fort St. George, 1682,  
Fort St. George Records, Madras.
- 6 Annals of Mysore Royal Family, p. 113
- 7 Wilks, History of Mysore, Vol. VIII, pp. 114, 115.
- 8 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission Do Madura", Nayaks of Madura, Vol. III, pp. 302-303.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Letters of St. Fort George, 8 March 1682,  
Fort St. George Records, Madras.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 A.V.C. Vol. III, p. 97, (1700), Karnataka Kavya Manjiri Series, No. 13, Mysore, 1938.
- 13 Ibid., p. 32.
- 14 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission Du Madura",  
Nayaks of Mysore, Vol. III, pp. 303, 304.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid.

- 17 A. M. R. F., Part I, p. 106.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission Do Madura", Nayaks of Mysore, pp. 303, 304.
20. Jedhe Shakawali, Shivaji Souvenir, p. 27.
- 21 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission Do Madura", Nayaks of Mysore, pp. 303, 304.
- 22 Jedhe Shakawali, Shivaji Souvenir, p. 27.
- 23 H. C. Rao, History of Mysore, Vol. I.
- 24 Ibid, Vol. I, p. 426.
- 25 AVC I, Chapter IV, p. 2.
- 26 Ibid, p. 50.
- 27 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission Do Madura", Nayaks of Mysore, Vol. III, pp. 304, 305.
- 28 Jedhe Shakavali, Shivaji Souvenir, p. 27.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission Do Madura", Nayaks of Mysore, Vol. III, p. 305.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 J. N. Sarkar, Aurangzeb, Vol. II, p. 53.
- 34 A. M. R. F., p. 115.
- 35 A. V. C. Vol. III, p. 136.

36 Madras Records, Diary and Consultation Book, 1681, p. 72.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Sambhaji Kalin Patrasar Sangrah, p. 59, Letter No. 181.

40 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission De Madura",  
Nayaks of Mysore, Vol. III, pp. 305, 306.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid, pp. 306, 307.

43 Epigraphia Carnatica, Vol. III (i), Ser. 24, (1686), p. 36.

44 Shambhu Samhita

45 A. V. C., Vol. III, p. 21.

46 Epigraphia Carnatica, vol. III (i), Sr. 12 (1686).

47 Ibid:

48 Ibid.

49 A. V. C. Vol. III, p. 28.

50 C. B., p. 4, V. 16, (as quoted by Muddachari in his  
Mysore Maratha Relations).

51 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission De Madure", Nayaks of Mysore,  
pp. 305, 306.

52 Ibid.

53 J. N. Sarkar, Aurangzib, Vol. IV, pp. 300, 303.

54 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission De Madura", Nayaks of Mysore,  
pp. 305, 307.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 C. B., p. 4, V. 16 (as quoted by Muddachari).

59 Ibid.

60 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission De Madura", Nayaks of Mysore,  
pp. 190, 191.

61 A. V. C., Vol. III, p. 21.

62 Basatin-US-Salatin, pp. 447, 448.

63 E. S. Waring, History of Madras, p. 117.

64 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission De Madure", Nayaks of Mysore, p. 337

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 C.B., p 4, (as quoted by Muddachari).

70 Ibid.

71 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission De Madure", Nayaks of Mysore, p. 377.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 C. B., p. 4, (as quoted by Muddachari).

78 R. S. Iyer, "La Mission De Madura", Nayaks of Mysore, <sup>Madura</sup> Vol. III, p. 377.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 Mysore Doregala Puravbhidayya Vivara, Vol. I, Part I, p. 110.

84 Wilks, History of Mysore, Vo. I, p. 226, AMRF, p. 110.

85 Ibid, p. 109.

86 AMRF, p. 110.

87 Orme, Historical Fragments, p. 155.

88 Jedhe Shakawali, Shivaji Souvenir, p. 30.

89 AMRF, Part I, pp. 106, 107.

90 J. N. Sarkar, Aurangzeb, Vol. V. pp. 55, 56.

91 M. D. P., Vol. II, p. 38.

92 Orme, Historical Fragments, Vol. I, p. 157.

93 Ibid.

94 Jedhe Shakavali, Shivaji, Souvenir, p. 30.

95 Sambhaji Patrasar Sangrah, p. 48.

96 Wilks, History of Mysore, Vol. I, pp. 110, 111.

97 Ibid.

98 J. N. Sarkar, Aurangzib, p. 54.

99 Ibid.

100 The Bara Mahal Records Section Magazine, p. 7.

101 Wilks, History of India, Vol. I, p.111.

102 Kincaid and Parasnisi, A History of Maratha People, Part I, p. 142.

103 Ibid.

104 Wilks, History of Mysore.

105 Imperial Gazetteer, Mysore, and Coorg, p. 21.

106 Ibid.

107 Jedhe Shakawali, Shivaji Souvenir, p. 29.

108 Orme, Historical Fragments, p. 154.

109 AMRF, Vol. I-C.

110 Ibid.

111 J. N. Sarkar, Aurangzib, Vol. V, p. 53.

112 Ibid.

113 G. S. Sardesai, Marathi Riyasat, Part II, p. 91.

114 A. V. C., Part III, p. 130.

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid.

117 Kincaid and Parasnisi, A History of the Maratha People, p. 142.


118 Epigraphia Carnatica, Vol. IX, DC 36, p. 66, Text 82.

119 Records of Fort St. George, 1687.

120 Orme, Historical Fragments of Mogal Empire, p. 156.

121 Ibid., p. 221.

122 Keladi Nripa Vyayam, p. 159, Verses 75-76.



Map showing the probable route of the Journey of Rajaram to the Carnatic during the period between 26th September and middle of November, 1659.

## CHAPTER V

### SOUTH INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH RAJARAM 1689-1700

On the capture of Sambhaji by the Mughals the edifice of the Maratha State built up by Shivaji seemed to fall to pieces. All the top ranking people of Maharashtra instantly convened a council with Yesubai, as the President. The Council decided to enthrone, Shivaji II, with Rajaram, the younger brother of Sambhaji, as a regent. Upon that Rajaram rose up and delivered an inspiring speech, calling upon all those that gathered, to forget anger and resentment at Sambhaji and to render their selfless services to the country<sup>1</sup>. 'Keladi-Nripavijaya' says, "that Ramraj ( Rajaram ) brother of Sambhaji was corwned"<sup>2</sup>. He remained loyal to Shivaji II as Bharata did to Rama, famed in the Ramayana<sup>3</sup>. It is quite likely that Rajaram remained uncrowned but did the work of a crowned prince.

Rajaram left, Raigad with his followers and established himself at Pratapgad; Raigad was captured along with Yeshbai and Shaji II by Zulfikar Khan on 3rd November 1689, after a seige of eight months<sup>4</sup>.

Chickadevaraja from the South and Aurangzeb from the North, troubled the Marathas. A Mughal force descended on to Panhala to exterminate the Marathas and took up its residence near

Panhala. That fort was won after a bitter fight by Mughals; realising the seriousness of the situation Rajaram decided to leave that place<sup>5</sup>. Rajaram left Panhala about the end of June 1689 and after many perilous adventures and a period of concealment in the Bednur and Bangalore territories, reached Vellore in the last week of October and entered Gingee in humble disguise four days later<sup>6</sup>. Thus the Mughal Maratha struggle in the region of Maharashtra and the shifting of the Maratha centre from Panhala to Gingee afforded a golden opportunity for Chickadevaraja to make conquests in the south and south-east of Mysore.

The perilous adventure of Rajaram and his party in the Karnataka are interesting factors in the Mysore-Maratha relations. Being pursued by the Mughal detachment, Rajaram and his followers passed the difficult and narrow route of Sanhyadri and stepped on the soil of the Bednur Kingdom, sojourning at Panhali (Honahalli) in Shimoga district. Rajaram sent words to Chanmagi, the ruler of Bednur Kingdom, seeking her help. The help that Rajaram needed was that his party should be escorted to Gingee without being attacked by the Mughals<sup>7</sup>. This landed Chennamaji in a dialamma. In the first place the Bednur-Nayak and the Marathas had been on friendly terms and since Rajaram himself had come to Bednur

in distress, it was but natural that she should help him; and which she did. Secondly, since the Mughals and the Marathas were not on good terms, it would naturally bring about the Mughal invasion of Bednur. Lastly Chennamaji thought Mysore also would rise up in arms against her. What Chennamaji thought, came out to be true in later years. The Mughals and the MysoreRaja invaded Bednur and caused incalculable havoc. Chennamaji wished to take the advice of her ministers on the point of helping the Marathas. She convened the Council of ministers and apprised them of the real situation. They decided in favour of supporting the Marathas, because they considered that it was inpplitical to deny aid, even to the enemy, if he should come to their doors. There upon, Chennamaji welcomed Rajaram and his followers warmly, treated them kindly and supplied them with all the necessary facilities to pass through her kingdom inperceived by the Mughals<sup>8</sup>. Thus Chennamaji, rendered help to the Marathas in their difficulties.

The result of her policy, was that, she had to defend her capital against the formidable invasion of Jan-Nissar-Khan, the Mughal general, who was in pursuit of the Maratha fugatives. The Mughal general demanded of the Rani, to surrender the Maratha prince and his followers. Chennamaji told the Mughal

general that the Marathas were not in her kingdom. In order to purchase retreat from the Mughals she presented them with costly jewels and clothes. This diplomacy did not work smoothly. The Mughal general received the presents, captured four Marathas fugitives, namely Rupaji Bhosale, Sambhaji Tage, Dunoba Manoji, and Raja-Ram and sent them to Aurangzeb, <sup>ANUPUR 404</sup> complaining that the Rani was ~~repignant~~ to the Maratha prince. Aurangzeb sent his son Azam Khan to invade Bednur, in cooperation with Jan-Nisar Khan. The Mughal army took possession of the fortress of Mahadevapra and Anandpura in Shimoga district and finally laid siege to Bednur itself. Chennamaji's life, itself, was in danger. She escaped to Bhuvangiri a fortress near Bednur from where, she directed her attacks. A terrible battle was fought between the two armies under the walls of Bednur<sup>10</sup>.

As to who won the victory, sources differ. First, Linguanna Kavi says, that "the Mughals suffered defeat and concluded a treaty with Chennamaji". Second, the Portuguese Viceroy in his letter of 1691, to the King of Portugal, described that Chennamaji was forced to sue for peace with the Mughals<sup>12</sup>. Third, according to the Persian source, the war was waged between the Mughals and the Marathas on the Bednur territory which at last came to speedy termination

by the intervention of Rani - Chennamaji, who purchased peace by paying a small ransom. Santa (Sambhaji) joined the Bednur army and fought against the Mughal army. It is likely that Chennamaji realising the horrors of war neutralised the hostility and brought the war to a close by paying a ransom to the Mughals. Thus Chennamaji suffered in men and material for having helped the Maratha prince. Her relations with the Mughals were stained greatly.

No sooner was the Mughal danger over, another difficulty offered to the Chennamaji. The fight with the Mughals was a factor which Chikkadevaraja, took advantage to take Chennamaji to task. Her pro-maratha policy caused his schemes of consequent in the direction of the Bednur Kingdom. In April 1689 Bagadi was occupied and the subsequent month Harpanhalli and Berayna were taken. Tiappaya, the Mayor Dalvoy, went and reduced Kader, Sakevepatna and Vastha in June and August 1690<sup>14</sup>. Thus Chikkadevaraja, annexed a number of territories, in Bednur Kingdom, Chennamaji could not prevent the expansion of Mysore, because the Mughals on one side and the Mysore Raja on the other, conducted atrocious wars and attacked a number of her territories and caused incalculable havoc in her kingdom. She had neither the adequate army nor a well-filled treasury to cope with the situation. Thus for her pro-maratha policy, Chennamaji was harassed both by the Mughals and Mysoreans.

As the objectives, with which these conquests were made, Mr. C. Hayavadam Rao says that, it was to justify the title of 'Karnataka Chakravarti', that Chikkadevaraja projected this campaign of conquest in the direction of Ikkeri<sup>15</sup>. This statement is not based on any evidence. A few territorial conquests in the direction of Ikkeri were not sufficient to justify his title of 'Karnataka Chakravarti'. There were some important towns, such as Kolar, Doddaballapur, and others which were not conquered by Chickadevaraja and the conquests of which were essential to call himself, 'Karnataka Chakravarti'. Anyway the object of these conquests was to punish Chennamaji for her policy of aiding the Marathas.

Adverting to the flight of Rajaram across the Karnataka region, it must be noted that Maratha party arrived in Bangalore which was then under the control of Chikkadevaraja. The Mysore Mughal contacts made the Mughals move freely in the Mysore Kingdom and the Mogal vigilant guards were already in Bangalore. The way in which treatment was accorded to Rajaram by his followers made the Mughal officers suspicious of the party. The impending danger, was averted by the devoted loyalty of Khando Ballal Chitnis, who advised Rajaram to leave the place as early as possible. He chose to remain on the spot maintaining

successfully his character of one of the pilgrims to Rameshwar.

Rajaram went by one route and Pralhad Niraji by another. Those that sayed were subjected to severe torture by the Mughal officers but their loyalty to the Maratha cause was such that they never disclosed their identity<sup>16</sup>. Thus the Marathas escaped the warth of the Mughal officers at Bangalore.

Chikkadevaraja did not take any steps to check the movements of the Marathas as long as his territories remained unaffected by their movements and there was no reason for him to worry. Moreover the Marathas were marching swiftly under the guise of pilgrims to Rameshwaram, frequently fending the Mughal danger, and as such it might have been impossible for the Raja to find out their identity and to adopt effective steps to deal with them. And more than that, since the Mughals were in pursuit of Marathas the task of Chikkadevaraja was comparatively less. On the whole nothing particular, happened in Chikkadevaraja's relations with the Marathas when Rajaram and his followers were in Bangalore.

At Channapatana, an event of great importance, took place which strained the Mysore-Maratha relations further. The old

officers of Golconda who had been taken into the service of the Mughals turned disloyal to the autocratic authority of Aurangzeb. They were ready to join the Marathas. The two Golconda officers Yachanemera Naik and Ismail Khan Maka and 4000 cavalry of the Mughals rebelled and interviewed Rajaram through Nilo Pant at Chennapatna<sup>17</sup>. These were certain reasons for the Golconda officers to be disloyal and make friendship with the Marathas. Ever since the days of Shivaji, and his Karnatak expedition, the Golconda Sultan and the Marathas had been on friendly terms. The Golconda Sultan had supported Sambhaji in his two devastating Mysore expeditions. But Aurangzeb had destroyed Golconda forcibly and taken the Golconda army under his service. When the Golconda officers were despatched in search of the Maratha fugitives it is said they joined the Marathas at Channapatna. It is further said that with this army the Marathas subdued Channapatana and descended to the south, after posting two officers, Ekoji and Shivaji, to govern the Channapatna principality<sup>18</sup>. It is not quite likely that Rajaram conducted the military operations at Chennapatna, because he was moving with all his rapidity in order to escape the vigilence of the Mughals. Therefore any delay in his project would have been dangerous. Further he

had taken the discontended Golconda officers into his service and thereby had given sufficient offence to the Mughal emperor. Therefore reaching a secure place namely Gingee to defend himself against the Mughal onslaught was his immediate concern. Moreover Rajaram had left Panhala on 25 September 1689 and reached Vellore on 28th October<sup>19</sup>. It is known that Rajaram had gone through many adventures after leaving Panhala. If Rajaram stood at Chennapatna conducting the military operations, it would not have been possible for him to reach Vellore in October 1689. Therefore Sambhaji Ghorpade who had fought against the Mughals in close cooperation with the Bednur army under the walls of Bednur fort might have plundered Juggadevaragal's possession of Chennapatna.

The conquest of Chennapatna by the Marathas attracted the attention of Chikkadevaraja. The Mysore army was despatched to Chennapatna where a terrible battle was fought in which the Marathas were defeated and pursued<sup>20</sup>. Thus the attempt of the Marathas to take Chennapatana was foiled. The result of the battle was that the relations between the two powers were greatly stained. Each party tried to overwhelm the other and exploit the situation for its own advantage.

Before the fighting began at Chennapatna, between the two armies, Rajaram and his followers left that place and towards the middle of October 1689 reached Srirangapatana. Edward Scott waring writes "Rama upon the murder of his brother, fled closely pursued by the enemy to Srirangapatna". He fled closely pursued by the enemy across the canvery, with only one of his followers, to Gingee and that too under the Guise of Luigayat Pilgrim and no event of any serious nature seemed to have taken place at Srirangapatna. If there was any trouble, Kannada sources would have mentioned it. But as we see, there is no mention of any Maratha Mysore conflict at Srirangapatna in the Kannada sources.

Rajaram and his followers reached Gingee in October 1689 and established the Maratha Council and assumed the insignia of royalty by appointing the 'Astha Pradhans' and holding his Court and began to distribute lavish offices and Jahgirs to his favourites. In consequence, Raja-Ram experienced financial difficulties and his ministers had to look around to raise money by all possible means to defray the charges of the army, which had been left at Panhala. His financial difficulties compelled Rajaram to sell the fort of Devarapatnam (Cuddalore), Fort St. David to the highest bidder, the British.

In July 1690, Mr. Charles Barwell and Thomas Yale, two factors were sent to Gingee, as Commissioners, to arrange matters with Raja-Ram for a farman to be signed, with instructions to insist upon the terms in the draft farman, particularly for the land and villages within the Gun-shot of the fort, with the exception of the Dutch factory, and the town of Guddalore and for the exception from all taxation for all the company's goods passing through the Marathas dominions. In the beginning of September the two Commissioners reported to the Chief Brahaman at the Maratha Court and were able to succeed and bring the young king to allow them, what towns and villages their gun could command, free passage to the Right Honourable Company, and accordingly had the farman drawn out verbatim to be signed by his majesty, with orders for delivery of the fort to them.

Rajaram was also pursued to grant the English the control of Cuddalore. Hatsell was, therefore, asked to go to Tegnapatanam and receive the possession of the fort and pay the stipulated sum and send military equipment and store from Kummimendu and Southern factories to that place. Hatsell's commission contained minute instructions as to the payment of the sum to Raja-Ram and as to the method of payment, and as to

the method of taking possession of the fort after which the random shot was to be fired which was to be done with the best brass gun from Madras that was sent specially for the purpose. Hatsell was further instructed that "it lies in the gunners' art to load and fire it to the best advantage" and carefully fix the points where the shot should fall. Accurate and detailed minutes and consultations were to be kept of all the transactions. A mint was also to be started for striking gold and silver coins. The Fort was to be named Fort St. David, probably in honour of the welsh saint, whom Mr. Yale, the Governor of Madras, himself a welshman wanted to honour.

The villages which fell within the random shot, are even today known as "Gundu Gramam" or Cannot ball villages. On Rajaram's arrival in Gingee, war began more vigorously, than before, between the Mughals and the Marathas. The result of Aurangazeb's idea of exterminating the Marathas, compelled him to spend his life in tents and miserable camps.

Footnotes on Chapter V

- 1 J. N. Sarkar, House of Shivaji, p. 335.
- 2 Linganna Kavi, (As quoted in Rajaram Charitam).
- 3 Rajaram Charitam, pp. 8, 9.
- 4 Jedhe Shakawali, Shivaji Souvenir, p. 32.
- 5 Linganna Kavi, Keladi Nrupa Vijayam, p. 160, Verses 77-80.
- 6 Jedhe Shakawali, Shivaji Souvenir, p. 32.
- 7 Govinda Vaidya, Kantivira Narisa Raja Vijayam, Vol. IX, p. 161.
- 8 Ibid., p. 166.
- 9 Ibid., pp. 16-22.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 B. Muddachari, Mysore Maratha Relations in the 17th Century, Appendix 6.
- 13 J. N. Sarkar, House of Shivaji, p. 236.
- 14 AMRF, Vol. I, p. 108.
- 15 Wilks, History of Mysore, p. 310.
- 16 Kincaid and Parasnisi, A History of Maratha People, pp. 100, 159.
- 17 Jedhe Shakawali, Shivaji Souvenir, pp. 32, 33.
- 18 The Baramahal Records, Vol. V (1915), p. 1.
- 19 J. N. Sarkar, Aurangzib, Vol. V, pp. 23, 24.
- 20 Chikkadevaraja Binnappam, pp. 58, 59 (As quoted by Muddachari).

CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSION (

The history of the Marathas in the South has its origin in Vijayanagar times. Maratha families, while they generally sought service under the neighbouring states of Bijapur, Golconda and Ahmednagar - seem to have been occasionally connected in some capacity or another with the administration of the Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar in its hay day (1336-1565).

On the fall of Vijayanagar in 1565, a confused state of affairs prevailed in South India, where there was no central authority to govern the empire. A vacuum was thus created in South India. Taking advantage of this confused state of affairs, a number of petty chieftains carved out independent principalities for themselves, of these principalities Karnataka was an important one.

The name of Shahaji, son of Maloji Bhonsale, looms large in the history of the Marathas, taking as he does, an active part in the history of the region. He can, more or less, be said to be the founder of the Maratha power in the South, chaning his allegiance to Bijapur, Ahmednagar and the Mogal emperor from time to time. Shivaji went over to Adil Shah of Bijapur in 1637-1638. Adilshah had sent his general Randulla Khan to invade the Karnatak about the close of 1638

with Shahaji Bhonsale as his lieutenant. They both conquered Inmadi Kempe, Gonda of Magadi. During the next twenty five years interrupted by a short imprisonment and arrest at Bijapur in 1649-50 Shahaji while ostensibly attached to the interests of his master the Bijapur-Sultan, gradually extended his sway over part of Bangalore and Kolar districts, ruling them, in an independent capacity. Assisted by Maratha brahmins as officials and maintaining unimpaired, the Hindu traditions of the officials, and the Government in the conquered tracts.

Meantime about the middle of 1654 the war of Bijapur and Golconda in the Karnatak was practically over. The two powers having finally accomplished the division of their conquests in 1656. The Bijapur left of the territory below the ghats almost coextensive with South Eastern frontier of Mysore, by the designation of Bijapuri Payeenghat. Shahaji continued to be in charge of the entire tract by the possession of Bangalore, Hoskote, Kolar, Dod-ballapur and Sira as his Jaghir. The developments tended to increase the power and prestige of Shahaji locally.

Maratha supremacy in the South, however, tended to assume a definite shape in the wake of Shivaji's expedition

to the Karnatak. That sovereign's extension of Maratha power over the length and breadth of South India and the establishment of out-posts at convenient points, which would enable them to realise their dues, the chauth and sardeshmukhi, were the prime features of his rule. Already by 1678 the Marathas had been a force to be reckoned with, in South India.

Shivaji's coronation in 1674, reduced his treasury and he was badly in need of money. So Shivaji entered into an alliance with Qutb-Shah, the Sultan of Golconda, who was fortunately under the influence of a Brahmin minister, Madanna, and his brother Akkanna. The agreement was that Shivaji should invade the Karnatak, the Sultan of Golconda bearing the cost of the expedition, that Shivaji was to undertake, reassume his father's Jaghir and to claim a share in the principality of Tanjore from his half brother Venkoji. The rest of the Karnataka was to be annexed to Golconda. After getting lavish presents from the Qutb-Shah, Shivaji left Hyderabad in March 1677.

The death of Shivaji in 1680, and the three decades that followed, saw the breaking up of the empire, that Shivaji had tried to build up, by the Mughals, under Aurangazeb. He began the thrust into South India and seize all the Maratha

districts that Shivaji had conquered in the Karnatak earlier. Also Sambhaji was seized and put to a cruel death.

In the realisation of their ambition of expansion in the South, the Marathas during 1680-86, were inevitably drawn into a conflict with Chickadevaraja Wodiar of Mysore. He as the representative of the Vijayanagar empire in South India, had been, since 1673, systematically extending the frontiers of the kingdom at the expense of Madura in the far South and Bijapur in the north. In 1682 he had laid siege to Trichinopoly itself. In this conflict, the Marathas, though they had sustained serious reverses, in the Srirangapatna area, during a diversion of their forces from Trichinopoly in 1682, eventually came out successful. They were, in July 1686, obliged to come to terms with Mysore and retire from the South as they were hard pressed in their homeland by the advance of the Mughal forces in the Deccan.

During the time of Sambhaji and Rajaram, the relations of the Marathas with the South Indian powers did not improve. The sixty-year history (1638-1698), is nothing but a period of continuous wars and mutual jealousies and internal conflicts. South Indian powers found in one's adversity another's opportunity. The relations between the Marathas

and Mysore were not all cordial during the life time of Shahaji, Shivaji, Sambhaji and Rajaram. No one was eager to improve the relations with the other resulting in an under current of hostility between the two powers. The Mysore ruler's activities widened the gulf between the Marathas and Mysore. The chief factors were the policy of expansion by the ruler of Mysore, the intervention of the Mughals and Harji Mahadik's rule in the South, Harji Mahadik was Sambhaji's general.

The confusion that precipitated after the death of Shivaji was an opportune moment for Chikkadevaraja, to start his policy of aggression. The zone of his influence went up to Sira. As a counter-measure Harji Mahadik, with the help of Dadaji and Jaitaji laid siege to Dharmapuri in Salem district. The army of Mysore marched to the scene of action and raised the seige. The occupation of some territories in Madura, in Banavara, and other Maratha places around Bangalore, by Chikkadevaraja, put an end to all possibilities of better relations between the two powers. Secondly it was the intension to destroy the Maratha power. To gain these objectives he joined the Mughals under Aurangzeb. In 1686 the opportunity to reduce Bijapur came. Alerted by the

fall of Bijapur the Marathas, under Sambhaji, launched forth their Karnatak expedition in the same year. The Mughals also intensified their activities in the greater part of the Karnatak in 1686. Zulfikar Khan and Dedar Bux were active in creating trouble for the Marathas in that region, Chikkadevaraja was not sincere in his alliance with Aurangzeb. He counted Mughal friendship to promote his own interests as he knew that both the Mughals and the Marathas were dangerous. His intensions were quite clear. He did not want to get rid of the Marathas and accommodate the Mughals in Mysore. He wished to be friendly as the Mughals were the only power in the South with whose support, he would inspire, awe in the minds of the Marathas in Mysore. The Marathas establishing a court at Bangalore, their steady progress and their conquest of the petty poligars and the constant threat of the Marathas, drove Chickkadevaraja to be friendly with Aurangzeb. His sending of an emissary to the Mughal court was therefore, very significant. Aurangzeb was pleased to know from that Ambassador that Maratha aggression was kept under check by the Mysore ruler.

This was a diplomatic move by the Raja of Mysore to secure the friendship of Aurangzeb, in order to keep the

Marathas at bay. If the Marathas, had lived in ~~an~~ amity with Mysore, Chickadevaraja would have cared very little for the Mughal friendship.

Harji Mahadik was the greatest of generals who played an important role to widen the gulf between the Marathas and Mysore. He fought Mysore and availed himself of the opportunity to extend the range of his activities and prestige in the Karnatak.

Harji's war against Mysore at Trichinopoly in 1682, his sending of Dadaji, Jetaji Katkar and Nimbalkar to reduce Mysore, the defeat of Kumariaiyya the Dalvi at Trichinopoly, his attempts to check the progress of Mysore, and the Mughals, in the Karnatak, elevate him to the rank of the foremost Maratha general of the Marathas, in Karnataka.

The hostile policy of the Marathas with Mysore continued during the life time of Rajaram also.

Although Rajaram, never waged a single battle against Mysore, his generals like Dhanaji and Santaji Ghorpade contributed enough to poison the relations of Mysore with the Marathas. Their quick movements from one place to another caused great disturbance in the Mysore Kingdom. If Harji

could be considered a great general in the South, in the time of Sambhaji, Santaji Ghorpade too could be considered as the protector of the Maratha interests in the South during the time of Rajaram. He had opposed the Mughals at Bednore in the battle of Chennapatn and showed remarkable skill against the Mysore army.

Suffering defeat at Chennapatn, he had changed the theatre of war to the southern region of Madura, where the interests of Mysore were predominant. He had seiged the Mysore territories and even captured Trichinopoly, a disputed place between Mysore and Madura. He had taken part in the last Mysore war of 1696 and put up a stout resistance against the Mysore army and even though had been overpowered, he never fired himself to dilute the differences and live at peace with Mysore. His ambition to cause unending rivalry between the Marathas and the Mysoreans and his glorious career in the south, came to an end in October 1696, when he quarreled with Rajaram over the question of holding the post of the senapati. The Maratha fortunes received a severe blow owing to his death in 1697.

The Mughal activities were a further factor, that caused a widening of the gulf between the Mysore Raja and the Marathas.

The existence of the Maratha Kingdom and the policy of Maratha expansion in the south were responsible for the friendship between the Mughals and the Mysoreans. The establishment of the Maratha Government at Gingee was the cause of Chikkadevaraja's strengthening of his relationship with the Mughals by sending an emissary to the Mughal Court.

The withdrawal of Rajaram and his followers from Gingee and the consequent difficulty that followed for the Marathas, brought to a close, the unhappy relationship during the 17th century.

It is a sad nemesis of fate that the Hindus in South India showed fissiporous tendencies after the debacle of Vijayanagar at Talikota in 1565. Had there been a well-knit race, rapid advance of the Mughals in South India, would not have been possible, at this time. The selfish interests of these principalities and the constant interference of the Marathas in the internal politics of these states, rendered it, difficult for them to establish themselves, as a stable power, in the south.

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